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DUE  PROCESS  DISAGGREGATION
Jason Parkin*
ABSTRACT
One-size-fits-all procedural safeguards are becoming increasingly suspect under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.  Although the precise requirements of due process vary from context to context, the
Supreme Court has held that, within any particular context, the Due Process Clause merely
requires one-size-fits-all procedures that are designed according to the needs of the average or
typical person using the procedures.  As the Court explained when announcing the modern
approach to procedural due process in Mathews v. Eldridge, the due process calculus must be
focused on “the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”  A more granular approach to due
process rules, the Court emphasized in a series of rulings between 1976 and 1985, would place
an undue administrative and financial burden on the government.
This aspect of procedural due process law no longer matches the on-the-ground realities of
many procedural regimes.  In recent years, the space between “the generality of cases” and “the
rare exceptions” has become populated with subgroups of individuals whose procedural needs are
different from those of the typical individual.  Whether due to subgroup members’ capacities and
circumstances, their stronger stake in the proceedings, or their unusually complex cases, subgroup
members forced to rely on one-size-fits-all procedures may be deprived of truly meaningful procedu-
ral safeguards.  At the same time, in ways that were unimaginable just a couple of decades ago,
technological developments have enabled government agencies to identify and accommodate sub-
group members at a comparatively small additional cost.  Based on these developments and the
inherently flexible nature of due process, it is time to move beyond the Court’s narrow focus on
“the generality of cases” and its preference for one-size-fits-all procedural rules.  To be sure, not
every subgroup warrants additional procedural safeguards.  However, rather than dismissing
subgroup members as “rare exceptions” unworthy of procedural accommodation, courts should
evaluate the due process rights of subgroups under the traditional Mathews balancing test.  This
refinement of due process doctrine is necessary to ensure that members of due process subgroups—
and not just average or typical individuals—are afforded the fundamentally fair procedural
protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
Determining the procedures required by the Due Process Clause is a
deceptively simple task.  The Supreme Court provided the instructions in
1976, when it adopted a three-factor balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge.1
Since then, courts have weighed the Mathews factors to specify which proce-
dural safeguards satisfy due process in contexts ranging from deprivations of
government benefits2 and terminations of parental rights,3 to deportations of
noncitizens4 and involuntary civil commitments to mental hospitals.5  Yet the
Supreme Court and lower courts have never fully answered one of the most
basic questions related to due process: In each context, for whom should due
process procedures be designed?  In other words, does the Due Process
Clause merely require that a procedural regime meet the needs of the aver-
age or typical person using the procedures, or is some additional tailoring
required for people whose procedural needs are quite different from those
of the majority?
On the few occasions when the Supreme Court has commented on this
aspect of due process, it has suggested a choice between extremes: either due
process requires one-size-fits-all procedures designed for the average or typi-
cal person in a particular context, or due process requires procedures that
are determined on a case-by-case basis.6  The Court made its preference clear
in Mathews, when it explained that due process rules must be targeted to “the
generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”7  Indeed, in almost every case
since Mathews, the Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to require
uniform procedural rules even for plaintiffs whose situations were extreme or
unusual in tangible ways.8  Those types of outlier cases do not warrant special
1 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).  In Mathews, the Court held that
three factors must be considered when determining the “specific dictates” of due process:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
[g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
2 See, e.g., id.
3 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–68 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–37 (1982).
5 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–27 (1979).
6 See infra Section I.A.
7 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344. But cf. id. at 349 (“All that is necessary is that the proce-
dures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to ‘the capacities and circumstances
of those who are to be heard.’” (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970)
(footnote omitted))).
8 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (rejecting a due process claim brought
by two students who were subject to exceptionally harsh corporal punishment at school);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (rejecting a due process claim brought by a class of
minor children who were involuntarily placed in mental health institutions by their parents
or guardians); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (rejecting
a due process claim brought by applicants for veterans’ disability benefits challenging a
statutory attorneys’ fee limitation that contained no exceptions for “complex” cases). But
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procedural rules, the Court has explained, because requiring such tailoring
would place an undue administrative and financial burden on the govern-
ment.9  Moreover, just identifying, let alone accommodating, the unusual
cases would be impracticable.10
It is no surprise that the Court has favored an approach to due process
that focuses almost exclusively on the needs of the average or typical person
using a given set of procedures.  With some procedural regimes used by hun-
dreds of thousands of people per year,11 it is difficult to imagine how govern-
ment agencies or courts could implement anything approaching
individualized procedures.  And even if it were possible, the fiscal and admin-
istrative burden created by such procedures would, under the Mathews bal-
ancing test, surely preclude a court from interpreting the Due Process Clause
to require such tailoring.
And yet, viewing due process in purely systemic terms overlooks more
than just extreme or idiosyncratic situations that may pop up from time to
time.  In particular, it fails to account for what this Article refers to as “sub-
groups”—that is, identifiable clusters of individuals in a particular context
whose procedural needs are different from those of the majority.
Subgroups can arise in any context in which due process rules are
applied across the board to a diverse population.12  For example, in the
immigration context, subgroups of pro se noncitizen minors and adults with
mental disabilities are less able to defend themselves against deportation
using the adversarial, trial-like procedures that are available to all nonci-
tizens.  In the veterans’ disability benefits context, the subgroup of individu-
als seeking benefits based on military sexual trauma must contend with
eligibility standards and an adjudication process that were designed for
claims that are more straightforward and easier to document.  And in the
school discipline context, the subgroup of students attending schools that
have criminalized their discipline policies is stuck with limited due process
rights based on an inaccurate perception of school discipline as educational
rather than criminal in nature.  The members of each of these subgroups are
situated quite differently from the rest of the individuals using the available
procedural safeguards, and those differences cast doubt on whether the pro-
see Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (adopting a case-by-case approach to
determine whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents
in termination of parental rights proceedings); Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011)
(declining to hold that due process never requires appointment of counsel in civil con-
tempt proceedings that could result in imprisonment).
9 See, e.g., Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 680 (noting the “impracticability of formulating a rule
of procedural due process that varies with the severity of the particular imposition”); see
also Walters, 473 U.S. at 326 (emphasizing the “greater administrative costs” that would be
incurred if the plaintiffs’ due process challenge was successful).
10 See, e.g., Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 680.
11 For example, the Social Security Administration alone resolves more than 500,000
hearings and appeals each year. See Information About Social Security’s Hearings and Appeals
Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (June 30, 2014), http://ssa.gov/appeals/#a0=2.
12 See infra Section II.A.
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cedures constitute due process for the subgroup members.  Yet current due
process doctrine does not acknowledge the existence of subgroups, nor does
it address whether or how the procedural needs of subgroups should be
accommodated.
Although the Supreme Court has not been presented with a due process
claim on behalf of a subgroup articulated as such, subgroups are not total
strangers to the law.13  In recent years, subgroup members have brought class
actions claiming that their due process rights are being violated even though
the available procedures are constitutionally sound for non-subgroup mem-
bers.  Government actors have taken affirmative steps, either on their own
initiative or in response to litigation, to pass legislation, promulgate regula-
tions, and alter policies in an effort to accommodate the needs of particular
subgroups.  And a growing branch of due process scholarship is concerned
with identifying the plight of particular subgroups and arguing that the Due
Process Clause mandates that those subgroups be provided with additional or
alternative procedural safeguards.
The increasing visibility of subgroups has not led to a corresponding
evolution of due process doctrine or theory, however.  Lower courts
presented with due process challenges on behalf of subgroups typically
respond in one of two ways: either they reject the claims based on the
Mathews Court’s statement that due process rules must be targeted to “the
generality of cases, not the rare exceptions,” or they apply the Mathews test to
only the subgroup, as if the subgroup members make up the entire popula-
tion of individuals using the procedures.  Absent from these decisions is any
discussion of how the subgroup concept fits into the Supreme Court’s sys-
temic approach to procedural due process.
Nor has the academic literature fully engaged with the doctrinal and
theoretical implications of subgroup due process claims.  The arguments
advanced in favor of subgroup accommodation largely ignore the Court’s
reluctance to define due process procedures according to anything other
than the needs of the typical or average person using the procedures.
Instead, like some lower courts, scholars have mostly analyzed the due pro-
cess rights of subgroup members using a Mathews analysis that focuses exclu-
sively on the facts and circumstances of the subgroup members themselves.
The lack of clarity concerning the due process rights of subgroups has
consequences.  Most obviously, across many different contexts in which the
Due Process Clause applies, subgroups of individuals are in danger of being
deprived of their constitutional right to fair procedures.  For their part,
judges considering due process claims brought by subgroups lack a clear and
consistent way to evaluate those claims.  Similarly, government agencies seek-
ing to establish procedural regimes that comport with due process require-
ments are unable to do so when the status of subgroup due process rights is
so unsettled.  And to the extent that subgroup claims are perceived to be
unsound under Supreme Court caselaw, subgroup members may believe that
13 See infra Section II.A.
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the only way to vindicate their rights is to go it alone, bringing claims on
behalf of just themselves rather than the rest of the members of their sub-
group.  Such individual challenges are costly, both for the subgroup mem-
bers who bring them as well as the government agencies that defend against
them and the courts that adjudicate them.
It does not need to be this way.  Although largely invisible to the
Supreme Court during the due process revolution, subgroups can no longer
be brushed aside as unworthy of attention under the Due Process Clause.
Whatever skepticism about subgroups that can be inferred from the Court’s
due process rulings of the 1970s and 1980s no longer matches up with the
on-the-ground realities of many procedural regimes that serve large and
diverse populations.  Indeed, the Court’s concern about the impracticability
of identifying subgroup members and the steep cost of accommodating their
needs can seem almost quaint: where once government workers would need
to gather and flip through thousands of paper files just to figure out who
might be in a subgroup, today’s massive computer databases can collect,
track, store, sort, and share information in ways that enable agencies to iden-
tify and accommodate subgroups at little extra cost.14
This Article argues that the Due Process Clause requires the government
to accommodate the procedural needs of subgroups in certain situations.  To
be clear, I am not suggesting that all subgroups must be accommodated in all
situations.  Rather, the argument here is that courts should not dismiss due
process claims brought by subgroup members simply because they do not
represent “the generality of cases”—subgroup members should have the
opportunity to prove, pursuant to the traditional three-factor Mathews test as
applied to members of the subgroup, that they are entitled to additional or
alternative procedural safeguards.15
Part I of this Article examines the evolution of due process doctrine as it
relates to the question of how procedures should be tailored.  It begins by
providing an overview of the Supreme Court’s modern procedural due pro-
cess jurisprudence, with a focus on the cluster of decisions issued in the wake
of the due process revolution of the 1970s.  It then summarizes the relatively
small amount of legal scholarship examining the Court’s preference for a
one-size-fits-all, systemic approach to due process rules.  Part I thus reveals
that current due process doctrine and theory overlook the procedural needs
of individuals whose cases cannot be characterized as “the generality of cases”
or “the rare exceptions.”
Part II traces the recent rise of due process subgroups.  It begins by iden-
tifying the numerous subgroup arguments that have emerged within just the
past decade.  Based on this survey of due process arguments on behalf of
subgroups, this Part defines subgroups as identifiable cohorts of individuals
who, because of some common characteristic, may be entitled to additional
or alternative procedural safeguards under a traditional Mathews analysis.
14 See infra Section II.C.
15 See infra Part III.
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Then, in an attempt to distill the distinguishing characteristics of due process
subgroups, this Part develops a typology that sorts subgroups into three cate-
gories: (1) subgroups composed of individuals who, due to their shared
capacities and circumstances, are less able to use the available procedures;
(2) subgroups composed of individuals who possess a stronger stake or inter-
est in the proceedings; and (3) subgroups composed of individuals who are
challenging a determination that is unusually complex or complicated.
Because these distinguishing characteristics directly affect one or more of the
Mathews factors, they raise questions about whether one-size-fits-all procedu-
ral safeguards satisfy the due process rights of subgroup members.  This Part
then documents recent technological developments that may enable govern-
ment officials to identify and accommodate subgroup members with relative
ease, suggesting that these shifts also affect the Mathews balance.
Part III explores how courts and government actors should respond to
claims that the due process rights of subgroup members may be different
from the rights of the average or typical individual in a particular context.
Through a close examination of the Supreme Court’s procedural due pro-
cess caselaw, this Part argues that an approach to procedural due process that
accommodates the divergent needs of subgroups fits comfortably within
established doctrine.  This Part then considers some of the likely objections
to subgroup accommodation, and the need for experimentation and empiri-
cal research in this area of law.  The Article concludes by arguing that the
requirements of due process must evolve in order to ensure that subgroup
members—and not just average or typical individuals—are provided with
procedural protections that are fundamentally fair.
I. DUE PROCESS FOR WHOM? THE SUPREME COURT’S SYSTEMIC APPROACH
TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Due process may be the oldest and most commonly invoked of our civil
rights,16 but the precise requirements of the Due Process Clause received
little attention until the due process revolution of the 1970s.  Only then, after
the establishment of the modern administrative state, did the Supreme Court
begin to confront difficult questions about what specific procedural safe-
guards are required by due process in the various contexts in which it
applies.  Among these questions, perhaps the most fundamental was: For
whom must due process procedures be designed?  In other words, in any
context in which due process applies, must the requisite procedures be indi-
16 See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 7–8 (1985) (observ-
ing that due process cases are found “in virtually every arena of constitutional conflict” and
that “[t]he great political issues of the times, certainly those of post-Civil War America—
immigration, state economic regulation, communist subversion, abortion, welfare rights,
the treatment of social deviance and criminality, to name but a few—converge on the
federal courts with due process claims leading the charge”); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process
and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1044 (1984) (referring to procedural
due process as “[b]y far the oldest of our civil rights”).
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vidually tailored to the needs of every person who may use them, or are one-
size-fits-all procedures sufficient?
This Part traces the evolution of the Supreme Court’s approach to pro-
cedural due process and the Court’s attempts to answer key questions about
the design of due process procedures.  It begins by examining a series of
decisions from the 1970s and 1980s in which the Court developed a largely
systemic approach to procedural due process rules, according to which all
individuals within a particular context are entitled to the same procedural
safeguards.  It then reviews the scholarly response to the Court’s chosen
approach to procedural due process.  Finally, this Part identifies what is over-
looked by the Court’s approach to determining the requirements of due
process.
A. The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s Systemic Approach
to Procedural Due Process
Between 1970 and 1985, the Supreme Court developed what became the
modern approach to determining which procedures are required by the Due
Process Clause when the government seeks to deprive an individual of a con-
stitutionally protected interest.  The following subsections discuss the devel-
opment of this approach, with a focus on how the Court handled due process
claims in procedural settings that served individuals who were not necessarily
similarly situated.
1. A New Focus on the Requirements of Procedural Due Process
The content of due process “seemed so clear to prior generations that
they included the term ‘due process’ in the [F]ifth and [F]ourteenth
[A]mendments virtually without discussion.”17  Similarly, for most of its his-
tory, the Supreme Court did not concern itself with the specific requirements
of procedural due process.18  Prior to 1970, the Court’s due process decisions
largely focused on what types of government action triggered any due pro-
cess rights at all.19  When due process did apply, the Court held that some
17 Rubin, supra note 16, at 1044.
18 See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.3, at 746 (5th ed.
2010) (referring to the Court’s “tradition of simply requiring a hearing and assuming that
‘hearing’ had a commonly understood meaning”).  For example, perhaps the most well
known discussion of the concept of due process includes no detail concerning the proce-
dural safeguards that would assure due process. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160–65 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
19 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a
series of statutes that denied welfare assistance to certain individuals); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding unconstitutional South Carolina’s denial of unemployment
benefits to a practicing Seventh-Day Adventist); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S.
232 (1957) (holding unconstitutional New Mexico’s denial of a former Communist’s
admission to its state bar); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (holding
unconstitutional the dismissal of a teacher who refused to testify about his membership in
the Communist Party before a federal legislative committee); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
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kind of hearing was required, but offered little elaboration as to what that
hearing should entail.20
The Court began to chart a new direction in Goldberg v. Kelly.21 Goldberg
was a landmark decision,22 establishing that welfare recipients had a due pro-
cess right to a hearing before their benefits were terminated.23  But the
Court did not stop there.  After declaring that “[t]he opportunity to be heard
must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard,”24 the Court considered the challenges facing welfare recipients who
seek to contest the termination of their benefits.25  In an attempt to fashion
procedures that would match the needs of welfare recipients, the Court spec-
ified the following core elements of the welfare “fair hearing”: the hearing
must provide welfare recipients an opportunity to state their position orally26
and confront and cross-examine witnesses;27 recipients must be allowed to
retain an attorney if they so desire;28 and the hearing must be adjudicated by
an impartial decisionmaker whose final decision states the evidence relied
upon and the legal basis for the ruling.29
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (upholding the Attorney General’s refusal of an immi-
gration hearing to the alien wife of a World War II veteran).
20 See PIERCE, supra note 18, § 9.3, at 744 (“Before 1970, the Court paid little attention
to the nature of the decisionmaking procedure required by due process.  Typically, the
Court held only that due process required a ‘hearing,’ without describing the nature of the
hearing required.”); Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1277 (1975) (“The Court’s early opinions on this score were rather vague.”). But cf. Rubin,
supra note 16, at 1060 n.80 (“By the 1960’s, the Court was more specific about the require-
ments of due process.”).
The Court’s ruling in Londoner v. City of Denver provides an early example of the lim-
ited detail with which the Court described the due process hearing requirement. See 210
U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (“[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it
shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be,
by proof, however informal.”); see also Friendly, supra (characterizing Londoner’s discussion
of hearings as “unilluminating”).  Other early examples include Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 300–06 (1937), and Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 227 U.S. 88, 91–92 (1913).
21 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see PIERCE, supra note 18, § 9.3, at 745 (stating that the Court
in Goldberg “announced its intention to address explicitly and in detail the issue of how
much process is due in each decisionmaking context to which due process applies”).
22 Goldberg is recognized as the first battle in the due process revolution that reshaped
the contours of procedural due process doctrine. See MASHAW, supra note 16, at 33 (“[B]y
most accounts the due process revolution began with the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Goldberg v. Kelly . . . .”); Friendly, supra note 20, at 1268 (observing that, since Goldberg, “we
have witnessed a due process explosion in which the Court has carried the hearing require-
ment from one new area of government action to another”).
23 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 260–66.
24 Id. at 268–69.
25 Id. at 269–70.
26 Id. at 269.
27 Id. at 269–70.
28 Id. at 270.
29 Id. at 271.
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The Court continued to scrutinize the requirements of due process after
Goldberg,30 ultimately adopting a new test to identify precisely which proce-
dures are required by due process in any given context.31  In Mathews v.
Eldridge, the Court announced that courts must determine the “specific dic-
tates of due process” by balancing the following three factors: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the proba-
ble value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3)
“the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.”32
Although the Mathews Court quoted Goldberg’s view that “[t]he opportu-
nity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those
who are to be heard,”33 it made clear that courts should weigh the Mathews
factors based on system-wide facts rather than the facts of individual claim-
ants.  According to the Court, “procedural due process rules are shaped by
the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the gener-
ality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”34  So, in Mathews, it did not matter
that Mr. Eldridge brought his lawsuit on behalf of only himself and not a
class of disability benefits claimants.  Under the “generality of cases” princi-
ple, the Court examined the facts and weighed the Mathews factors as they
applied to disability claimants in the aggregate, not just to Mr. Eldridge.35
And, once the Court determined the procedures required by the Due Pro-
cess Clause, those procedures were deemed sufficient for all disability bene-
fits claimants, not just Mr. Eldridge.36
In the decades since deciding Mathews, the Court has continued to use
Mathews’s three-factor balancing test, characterizing it as “a general
approach” for determining the specific procedures required by due pro-
30 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
31 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
32 Id.
33 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (“All that is necessary is
that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to ‘the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard,’ to insure that they are given a meaningful
opportunity to present their case.” (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69)).
34 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
35 See, e.g., id. at 341–43 (analyzing the first Mathews factor based on the hardship
imposed upon a generic “erroneously terminated disability recipient,” rather than the
hardship actually imposed on Mr. Eldridge); id. at 344 (when discussing the nature of
disability benefit determinations, focusing on the complexity of “most cases” not the com-
plexity of Mr. Eldridge’s case); id. at 345 (explaining that critical information related to
eligibility for disability benefits “usually is derived from medical sources,” without any dis-
cussion of Mr. Eldridge’s eligibility determination); id. at 347 (focusing on the administra-
tive burden and societal costs associated with providing a pre-deprivation hearing in “all
cases,” not just in Mr. Eldridge’s case).
36 See id. at 349 (stating the Court’s holding in systemic, not individual, terms).
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cess.37  Indeed, the Court has used the Mathews test to evaluate due process
claims in an ever-growing number of contexts, including immigration law,38
family law,39 public employment law,40 and national security law.41
Although the three Mathews factors have remained unchanged through
the years, the Court has refined its stance on the systemic nature of procedu-
ral due process rights.  The Court considered this aspect of the procedural
due process analysis in a series of decisions issued during the ten-year period
after Mathews was decided.  These decisions, and the reasoning that underlies
them, shed light on how due process procedures should be tailored to the
needs of the individuals who use them.
2. Applying Mathews and the “Generality of Cases” Principle
Little time passed before the Court was called upon to revisit Mathews’s
systemic approach to procedural due process.  Between 1976 and 1985, the
Court considered this aspect of procedural due process in five different
cases;42 in all but one of those cases, the Court reaffirmed its view that proce-
dural due process rules must be based on “the generality of cases, not the
rare exceptions.”43  Although the Court handed down those decisions almost
thirty years ago, they remain the Court’s most extensive inquiry into the
nature of due process rules.44
The Court initially held firm to its systemic approach in the face of fairly
extreme facts.  In Ingraham v. Wright,45 the first post-Mathews decision to
apply the Mathews balancing test, the Court rejected a claim that public
school students were entitled to a hearing before being subjected to corporal
37 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979); see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.8(i), at 165 (5th ed. 2012) (“All courts
must now employ the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine the type of proce-
dures that are required by due process when a government action would deprive an indi-
vidual of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.”). But cf. Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002) (declining to use the Mathews approach to
evaluate a due process challenge to the adequacy of a method of giving notice, and observ-
ing that the Court has “never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for
deciding due process claims”).
38 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–37 (1982).
39 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–68 (1982).
40 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542–45 (1985).
41 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528–35 (2004).
42 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Parham, 442 U.S. at 584; Lassiter v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745; Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radia-
tion Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
43 Compare Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 680 n.49, Parham, 442 U.S. at 612–13, Santosky, 455
U.S. at 757, and Walters, 473 U.S. at 321, with Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31–32 (conspicuously
omitting the Mathews “generality of cases” language from its due process analysis).
44 Since deciding these cases, the Supreme Court has touched on this aspect of proce-
dural due process just once, in Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).  The Court’s deci-
sion in Turner is discussed in Section III.A.
45 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 651.
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punishment by school officials.46  The Court acknowledged that the two
Ingraham plaintiffs were the victims of an “exceptionally harsh” disciplinary
regime.47  As the Court recounted, one plaintiff was paddled so severely that
“he suffered a hematoma requiring medical attention and keeping him out
of school for several days,”48 while the second plaintiff lost the full use of his
arm for a week due to one of his several paddlings.49
Yet the Court declined to allow the severity of the plaintiffs’ injuries to
affect the due process analysis.50  Characterizing the mistreatment suffered
by the two plaintiffs as “an aberration,”51 the Court weighed the Mathews
factors based on how school officials “usually” administer corporal punish-
ment.52  The Court further observed that only one-size-fits-all procedures
were available under the Due Process Clause, citing the “generality of cases”
principle announced in Mathews.53  Based on this systemic view of school dis-
cipline procedures,54 the Court ruled that due process required no more
procedural protections than those that were already available to students.55
The Court maintained its focus on systemic facts and uniform proce-
dures in Parham v. J.R., a class action challenging Georgia’s procedures for
admitting children for treatment to state-run mental hospitals.56  The plain-
tiff class alleged that the state routinely admitted children to mental hospitals
in error, but the Court, applying the Mathews test, found no due process
violation.57  The Court acknowledged that the state’s procedures were “not
totally free from risk of error,”58 but such risk did not drive the Court’s analy-
sis.  Rather, the Court emphasized—repeating it twice within two pages of its
opinion—Mathews’s view that “procedural due process rules are shaped by
46 Id. at 682.
47 Id. at 657.
48 Id. (footnote omitted) (noting that the student was “subjected to more than 20 licks
with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal’s office”).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 682.
51 Id. at 677.
52 Id. at 675–82 (applying the Mathews test).  For example, the Court stated that
“because paddlings are usually inflicted in response to conduct directly observed by teach-
ers in their presence, the risk that a child will be paddled without cause is typically insignifi-
cant.” Id. at 677–78 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 680 n.49.
54 Although the Court recognized that its due process analysis was affected by what it
described as “the common-law privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal
punishment on children in their care,” id. at 674, the Court nonetheless applied the
Mathews test to determine which procedural safeguards were required by the Constitution.
Id. at 675–82.
55 Id. at 682.
56 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
57 See id. at 599–617.
58 Id. at 615; see also id. at 612 (“By expressing some confidence in the medical deci-
sionmaking process [used by Georgia], we are by no means suggesting it is error free.”).
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the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the gener-
ality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”59
Just two years later, however, the Court took a quite different approach
to a procedural due process claim.  In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
an indigent plaintiff argued that her due process rights were violated when
the trial court refused to require North Carolina to provide government-
appointed counsel in a case involving the termination of the plaintiff’s paren-
tal rights.60  Applying Mathews, the Court rejected the claim, holding that the
Due Process Clause did not require that the plaintiff be appointed counsel.61
The Lassiter Court reached its conclusion after first making a striking
pronouncement: the requirements of due process, at least in cases involving
the termination of parental rights, must be determined case by case, based
on a review of the individual facts of each case.62  Unlike its decisions in
Ingraham and Parham, the Court did not rely on (or even refer to) the “gen-
erality of cases” principle announced in Mathews.63  Instead, the Lassiter
Court warned against “rigid” across-the-board rules,64 explaining that it is
“neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed
set of guidelines to be followed” when deciding whether parents have a due
process right to appointed counsel.65
The five-member majority opinion in Lassiter provoked a strongly
worded dissent authored by Justice Blackmun.  According to Justice Black-
mun, the majority’s reasoning reflected “a sharp departure”66 from the
Court’s previous view that due process “requires case-by-case consideration of
different decisionmaking contexts, not of different litigants within a given con-
text.”67  Justice Blackmun predicted that the majority’s approach would be
“both cumbersome and costly” to implement,68 and that it would diminish
“the predictability and uniformity that underlie our society’s commitment to
the rule of law.”69
Lassiter’s case-by-case approach to procedural due process rules was
short-lived.  In the following term, the Court returned to its systemic view of
59 Id. at 612–13 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)); id. at 615
(observing that this statement from Mathews “bears repeating”).
60 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
61 Id. at 32–33.
62 Id. at 27–33.
63 In fact, Lassiter seemed to turn the Mathews reasoning on its head, arguing that a
one-size-fits-all set of procedural safeguards was inappropriate because “the [Mathews] fac-
tors will not always be so distributed.” Id. at 31.
64 Id. (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
65 Id. at 32 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790).
66 Id. at 49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67 Id.; see also id. (“In analyzing the nature of the private and governmental interests at
stake, along with the risk of error, the Court in the past has not limited itself to the particu-
lar case at hand.”).
68 Id. at 51.
69 Id. at 50.
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procedural due process in Santosky v. Kramer.70 Santosky involved a due pro-
cess challenge to the standard of proof in cases involving the termination of
parental rights.  Justice Blackmun, now writing for the majority, acknowl-
edged Lassiter but, quoting Mathews, emphasized that procedural rules must
be “shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as
applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”71  The Court then
proceeded to apply the Mathews test and hold that due process required an
elevated standard of proof to be applied in all cases involving the termination
of parental rights.72
Any lingering doubts as to the Court’s take on procedural due process
rules seemed to be resolved by the Court’s 1985 decision in Walters v.
National Association of Radiation Survivors.73  The plaintiffs in Walters brought a
due process challenge to a federal statute that prohibited attorneys from
charging more than ten dollars to represent a veteran seeking disability bene-
fits.74  The plaintiffs challenged the fee limit as it applied to all cases, but
emphasized the existence of unusually complex cases that claimants could
not handle without the assistance of a lawyer.75  In the course of applying the
Mathews test, the Court reaffirmed the systemic nature of procedural due
process: “[T]he fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn
on the result obtained in any individual case,”76 and the focus must be on
“the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”77  Guided by this principle,
the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that the fee limit, on its face,
did not violate due process.78
The “generality of cases” principle received additional attention in a
concurring opinion in Walters.  Although Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice
Blackmun, agreed that the plaintiffs had not yet established a “sound basis
for carving out a subclass of complex claims” that required additional due
process protection,79 she wrote separately to note that the claims of any
70 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).  Despite Santosky’s refusal to adopt
Lassiter’s case-by-case approach, lower courts did not ignore Lassiter. See, e.g., Buttrey v.
United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1178 (5th Cir. 1982) (when applying Mathews, “[e]ach
case . . . will depend upon the nature of the facts challenged and upon the effectiveness of
the procedures afforded the plaintiff for challenging them”).
71 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
72 Id. at 767–68.
73 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
74 Id. at 307–08.
75 Id. at 314 (“Though never expressly defined by the District Court, these cases appar-
ently include those in which a disability is slow developing and therefore difficult to find
service connected, such as the claims associated with exposure to radiation or harmful
chemicals, as well as other cases identified . . . as involving difficult matters of medical
judgment.”).
76 Id. at 321.
77 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
78 Id. at 334.
79 Id. at 337 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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“identifiable groups” remained open on remand.80  According to Justice
O’Connor, such an argument is available under the Due Process Clause
because “[t]he ‘determination of what process is due [may] var[y]’ with
regard to a group whose ‘situation differs’ in important respects from the
typical veterans’ benefit claimant.”81
* * *
The line of procedural due process cases beginning with Mathews and
ending with Walters established a strong preference for procedural rules that
apply uniformly to all individuals in a particular context.82  That said, the
Court did not offer much insight into the rationale underlying this choice.
For the most part, the Court merely invoked Mathews’s language about the
“generality of cases,” without further elaboration.83 Ingraham is something of
an exception in this regard, as the Court supplemented its reference to the
“generality of cases” principle with a warning about the consequences of
departing from one-size-fits-all procedural rules.  “[F]ormulating a rule of
procedural due process that varies with the severity of the particular imposi-
tion” is impracticable,84 the Court observed, raising concerns about the
development of “manageable standards for determining what process is due
in any particular case.”85  The most detailed rationale for uniform procedu-
ral rules appeared in Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lassiter, which argued that
generally applicable procedural rules help to “guarantee[ ] the predictability
80 Id. at 336.  Indeed, on remand, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion guided the
district court’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ due process claim. See Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation
Survivors v. Walters, 111 F.R.D. 595, 597 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
81 Walters, 473 U.S. at 337 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quot-
ing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 617 (1979)).
82 The Court’s decision in Lassiter is the obvious exception, but, after its subsequent
decisions in Santosky and Walters, the Court re-established its preference for a systemic
approach to procedural due process rules. See, e.g., Randy Lee, Twenty-Five Years After
Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling from the Right Spot on the Wrong Road to the Wrong Place, 23 CAP.
U. L. REV. 863, 979 (1994) (“Among the descendants of Mathews v. Eldridge, Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services of Durham County is not the case with the greatest impact on the
determination of procedural due process.  In fact, within a year of that decision, the Court
handed down another that limited the effect of Lassiter both structurally and substantively.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring) (agreeing to join “the narrow holding of the Court”).
83 See Walters, 473 U.S. at 321, 330, 337; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982);
Parham, 442 U.S. at 613, 615; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977).  The most
detailed and nuanced rationale for the “generality of cases” principle comes from Justice
Blackmun’s dissent in Lassiter. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing, inter alia, that one-size-fits-all procedures “guarantee[ ] the predictability and uniform-
ity that underlie our society’s commitment to the rule of law”).
84 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 680.
85 Id. at 682 n.55 (suggesting that adopting adjustable procedures in the school disci-
pline context would mean that school officials would be “left to guess” at the constitution-
ally required procedures).
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and uniformity that underlie our society’s commitment to the rule of law,”86
and to avoid practical difficulties related to determining the appropriate pro-
cedures at the outset of a case and on appellate review.87
In addition to providing minimal justification for a systemic approach to
due process, the Court did not clearly define what constitutes “the generality
of cases” as opposed to “the rare exceptions.”  In Mathews and Ingraham, the
Court used words such as “typical” and “usual” to describe the factual scena-
rios to which the Court applied the Mathews analysis,88 but the Court offered
no hint as to precisely what those terms might mean.  The Court’s most
straightforward pronouncement came in Walters, when it explained that “a
process which is sufficient for the large majority of a group of claims is by
constitutional definition sufficient for all of them,”89 which the Court con-
trasted with claims based on only “a tiny fraction of the total cases pending.”90
But even that explanation does not provide much additional clarity to courts
seeking to honor the “generality of cases” principle.
Despite the Court’s hostility towards due process claims seeking some-
thing more tailored than one-size-fits-all procedures, the Court did seem to
leave some room for claims that could overcome the  “generality of cases”
principle in Mathews.  Although not expressed in the clearest of terms, the
Court in Parham suggested, after rejecting the plaintiff class’s due process
challenge, that “the determination of what process is due [may] var[y]” with
regard to a group whose “situation differs” in important respects from the
typical claimant.91  And in Walters, even though the Court was reviewing a
lower court order that applied to all claimants, the Court offered its views on
a hypothetical due process claim limited to “complex” cases.92  Rather than
86 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 51 & n.19.  According to Justice Blackmun, it would be difficult for judges to
discern the proper level of procedure at the outset and to review the constitutionality of
chosen procedures after the fact. Id.
88 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 677–78 (focusing the due process analysis on what “usu-
ally” prompts corporal punishment in schools and the “typically insignificant” risk of
error); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976) (focusing the due process analysis on
the “typical[ ]” disability benefits claimant).
89 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985) (emphasis
added).  Even this formulation could be viewed as ambiguous, however, as “a group of
claims” could be understood as referring to all claims in a particular context or a subgroup
of claims in that context.  The Court has quoted this reference to “the large majority of a
group of claims” just once, in a dissent authored by Justice Souter. See Burns v. United
States, 501 U.S. 129, 152 n.7 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting) (applying the Mathews factors
to a due process challenge to criminal sentencing procedures).  There, Justice Souter
found no due process violation because, inter alia, “[t]here is no contention that this class
of defendants is sufficiently large to affect the due process calculus in this case.” Id.  No
further explanation of what would or would not be a “sufficiently large” group of individu-
als was provided.
90 Walters, 473 U.S. at 330 (emphasis added).
91 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 617; see also Walters, 473 U.S. at 337 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 617).
92 Walters, 473 U.S. at 330.
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simply stating that no subgroup of cases could ever trigger additional or alter-
native procedural safeguards, the Court explained that individuals with com-
plex cases would need to make a “very difficult factual showing” to overcome
the “generality of cases” principle.93  The Walters plaintiffs had failed to make
such a showing because, among other things, they had not clearly defined
the potential subgroup of cases or identified how prevalent those cases
were.94  Yet, this dicta from Walters, as well as Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion,95 suggests the possibility that the “generality of cases” principle can
be overcome.
B. Critiques of the Supreme Court’s Systemic Approach to Procedural Due Process
For more than a decade after Mathews was decided, scholars engaged in
something of a critical dismantling of the Court’s three-factor balancing
approach to determining the requirements of procedural due process.
Those favoring a more expansive interpretation of the Due Process Clause
expressed concerns about the Court’s adoption of an instrumentalist, cost-
benefit approach to due process.  They accused the Mathews test of prioritiz-
ing accurate and efficient decisionmaking over harder-to-define “process val-
ues.”96  Scholars also argued that assigning the proper weight to each
93 Id.
94 Id.  (“[O]n this record we simply do not know how those cases should be defined or
what percentage of all of the cases before the VA they make up.”); see also id. at 337
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In its present posture, this case affords no sound basis for
carving out a subclass of complex claims that by their nature require expert assistance
beyond the capabilities of service representatives to assure the veterans ‘[a] hearing appro-
priate to the nature of the case.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
95 See id. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring)(noting that the claims of any “identifiable
groups” remain open on remand).
96 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 48 (1976) (“The Eldridge Court conceives of the values of procedure too narrowly:
it views the sole purpose of procedural protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits
its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from correct or incorrect decisions.  No atten-
tion is paid to ‘process values’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)) [hereinafter Mashaw, The Supreme
Court’s Due Process Calculus]; Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Inde-
pendence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 473 (1986) (“An efficiency-
oriented balancing test, therefore, weighs an inevitable and immediately recognizable
administrative cost against a largely prophylactic interest in the use of specific procedural
protections.”); cf. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for
“Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (1974) (suggesting, prior to Mathews, that legal
processes should be evaluated with respect to such factors as “process value efficacy” in
addition to “[g]ood result efficacy”).
For discussions of the meaning and importance of “process values,” see, for example,
Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV.
885, 888–93 (1981) (discussing the importance of an individual’s right to participate in
decisions that affect her in important ways); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in Procedural Due Process (explaining the importance of “process values” such as an
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Mathews factor is exceedingly difficult,97 creating opportunities for courts to
manipulate the Mathews test to justify limited procedures.98  At the same
time, others assailed the notion that judges should be the ones determining
the procedures required by due process.99  Related to this view was the argu-
ment that due process rules should be determined not by application of the
Mathews test, but by whatever procedures are specified by state and federal
legislation.100
In contrast with the numerous and wide-ranging critiques of the Mathews
balancing test, scholars have had comparatively little to say about the “gener-
ality of cases” principle announced in Mathews.  This aspect of the Court’s
approach to due process is not entirely missing from the post-Mathews litera-
ture; rather, it is just referred to routinely and without the degree of critical
analysis applied to other aspects of the due process calculus.101
To the extent that scholars have considered the Court’s systemic
approach at all, they have done so in relation to Lassiter’s departure from it.
individual’s participation in administrative decisionmaking), in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS
XVIII, at 126, 127–28 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
97 See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 776
(1978) (observing that “the Court has not attempted to define how one tells how much
[the cost of additional procedures] weigh or how that weight can be compared with that of
competing interests”); Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus, supra note 96, at 48
(criticizing the Mathews approach for “ask[ing] unanswerable questions”); Rubin, supra
note 16, at 1138 (“This reliance upon ‘weight,’ which is a useful approach for dealing with
bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors such as those in Mathews are
concerned.”).
98 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing
that the Mathews balancing approach “not only overlooks the unquantifiable human inter-
est in receiving decent treatment, but also provides the Court a facile means to justify the
most cursory procedures by altering the relative weights to be accorded each of the three
factors” (footnote omitted)); cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 189, 196 (1991) (“Although framed in terms that invite quantitative analysis, the
Mathews balance is rarely conducted with empirical evidence.”).
99 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 771 (1990)
(arguing that “[t]here are no authoritative, even plausible, constitutional answers” to ques-
tions related to the specific contours of due process in the public benefits context).
100 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 125
(“Giving judges this power of revision may be wise or not.  The Court may design its proce-
dures well or poorly.  But there is no sound argument that this is a legitimate power or
function of the Court.”).  But see Redish & Marshall, supra note 96, at 457–68.  Although
this argument, often referred to as the “bitter with the sweet” approach to procedural due
process, appeared to gain support in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153–54 (1974), the
Court ultimately rejected it in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541
(1985).
101 See, e.g., infra notes 105–14 and accompanying text. But cf. Owen M. Fiss, Reason in
All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 801–03 (1990) (arguing, with respect to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, that “the Court’s perspective must be system-
atic, not anecdotal: It should focus not on the plight of four or five or even twenty families,
but consider the welfare system as a whole, which can only be understood as a complex
interaction between millions of people and a host of bureaucratic and political
institutions”).
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Some scholars have argued that adjusting procedures based on individual
facts is dangerous, as it could give rise to the appearance of arbitrariness or
even favoritism.102  Others have contended that fashioning procedures on a
case-by-case basis is unwieldy and inaccurate, creating headaches both for
trial courts required to make threshold determinations about the appropri-
ate procedures and for appellate courts asked to review such determina-
tions.103  Scholars have also suggested that, as a practical matter, busy judges
may simply decline to inquire into the details of individual cases and, instead,
use the minimal procedural protections available in that context.104
With so little critical analysis of the rationale underlying the Court’s sys-
temic view of procedural due process and Mathews’s “generality of cases”
principle, it is not surprising that the academic literature offers scant insight
into what the principle actually means and how courts should apply it.  To be
sure, there is widespread agreement that the approach adopted in Mathews
and reaffirmed in Walters is “systemic” in nature;105 one commentator has
102 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 82, at 984–85 (“[T]he case-by-case approach invites the
appearance of favoritism and unfairness that the Due Process Clause itself seeks to avoid.”).
103 Much of this criticism of the case-by-case approach has come in the context of argu-
ments concerning the right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g.,
Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 533 (2006); John Pollock, The Case Against Case-by-Case: Courts
Identifying Categorical Rights to Counsel in Basic Human Needs Civil Cases, 61 DRAKE L. REV.
763, 767–68 (2013); Kevin W. Shaughnessy, Note, Lassiter v. Department of Social Ser-
vices: A New Interest Balancing Test for Indigent Civil Litigants, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 261,
282–83 (1982); see also John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, It’s Not Triage if the Patient Bleeds
Out, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 40, 41–44 (2012), https://www.law.upenn.edu/jour
nals/lawreview/articles/volume161/issue1/PollockGreco161U.Pa.L.Rev.40(2012).pdf.
But see Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro
Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 991 (2012) (arguing in favor of a case-by-case
approach to determining whether the Due Process Clause requires government-appointed
counsel in certain civil cases).
104 See, e.g., William Wesley Patton, Standards of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel and
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Child Protection and Parental Severance Cases, 27 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 195, 201–02 (1996); Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the
Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 19
J.L. & POL’Y 683, 694–95 (2011); cf. Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-
Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186, 186 (2006) (“Determining
how, and how often, the trial courts actually perform [the Lassiter] due process analysis is a
remarkably difficult task . . . .”).
105 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 336–37 & n.160 (1993) (discussing the sys-
temic approach to procedural due process and observing that the Mathews test is used “to
ensure administrative procedures adequate to achieve a tolerable average level of accuracy
in the application of law to fact”); Daniel S. Feder, Note, From Parratt to Zinermon: Authori-
zation, Adequacy, and Immunity in a Systemic Analysis of State Procedure, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
831, 846 (1990) (“The inquiry is solely whether the system, as a whole, provides sufficient
guarantess [sic] of accurate determinations for most cases . . . .”); cf. Jacob R. Fiddelman,
Protecting the Liberty of Indigent Civil Contemnors in the Absence of a Right to Appointed Counsel,
46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 431, 451 (2013) (“If a certain procedural protection is to be
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even characterized it as “a facial approach to due process questions.”106  But
efforts to define which cases are included within the “generality of cases”
have been unsatisfying, with scholars resorting to ambiguous qualifiers such
as “run-of-the-mill cases,”107 “the whole of cases,”108 or “most cases.”109
Focusing on the other end of the spectrum is no more helpful, as scholars
have agreed that the Court’s approach to procedural due process does not
turn on the facts of “exceptional” cases110 or demand “extreme individualiza-
tion.”111  As one leading administrative law casebook puts it, “the determina-
tion of what process is due is performed on a ‘wholesale’ basis for general
categories of disputes, rather than on a ‘retail’ basis taking into account the
particular characteristics of each case.”112  Unfortunately, none of these for-
mulations offer much more guidance than the Court’s references to the
“generality of cases” in Mathews113 and the “large majority” in Walters.114
C. The Gap in the Systemic Approach to Procedural Due Process
The overarching message of the Supreme Court decisions and legal
scholarship discussed above appears clear: the requirements of procedural
due process must be based on the needs of the typical or average user of
those procedures.  In other words, when courts are called upon to determine
the precise contours of the Due Process Clause, they must apply the Mathews
required, then, it must provide a sufficient enhancement to judicial accuracy in the
aggregate.”).
106 Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State
Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 256 n.38 (2003)).
107 Barton & Bibas, supra note 103, at 984 (“[D]ue process rules should be crafted for
run-of-the-mill cases, not exceptional ones.” (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344
(1976))).
108 Emily Woodward Deutsch & Robert James Burriesci, Due Process in the Wake of
Cushman v. Shinseki: The Inconsistency of Extending a Constitutionally-Protected Property Interest
to Applicants for Veterans’ Benefits, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 220, 239 (2011) (“The Supreme Court
[in Walters] further remarked that the rules and the inherent risks associated with the
truth-finding process should be considered as applied to the whole of cases and not the
exceptions.”).
109 Feder, supra note 105, at 846 (“The inquiry is solely whether the system, as a whole,
provides sufficient guarantess [sic] of accurate determinations for most cases.”).
110 See, e.g., Barton & Bibas, supra note 103, at 984 (“[D]ue process rules should be
crafted for run-of-the-mill cases, not exceptional ones.” (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344));
Deutsch & Burriesci, supra note 108, at 239 (“The Supreme Court [in Walters] further
remarked that the rules and the inherent risks associated with the truth-finding process
should be considered as applied to the whole of cases and not the exceptions.”).
111 Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 2003 n.161 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not demand
extreme individualization even when due process requires some kind of individual
hearing.”).
112 STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 698 (7th
ed. 2011).
113 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
114 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985).
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test to the facts associated with “the generality of cases, not the rare
exceptions.”115
Missing from the Court’s systemic approach to procedural due process is
any recognition that a subgroup of cases may present procedural needs that
are quite different from “the generality of cases,” but are too numerous to be
dismissed as “the rare exceptions.”  To be sure, the Court has not addressed a
due process claim on behalf of a subgroup of individuals seeking additional
or substitute procedural safeguards.  But on the rare occasion when the
Court has acknowledged, albeit in dicta, that some groups of cases might be
atypical in ways that could affect the Mathews balance (and sizeable enough
not to be dismissed as “rare exceptions”), the Court has held firm to its sys-
temic view of due process.116  Requiring government agencies to provide any-
thing other than uniform one-size-fits-all procedures, the Court has
explained, would be too administratively burdensome.117  Thus, for lower
courts, government agencies, legislators, and individuals attempting to dis-
cern the due process rights of subgroups of individuals with different proce-
dural needs than the majority, the Court’s approach has suggested a narrow
focus on “the generality of cases” to the exclusion of all others.
II. BETWEEN THE “GENERALITY OF CASES” AND THE “RARE EXCEPTIONS”:
THE RISE OF DUE PROCESS SUBGROUPS
The Supreme Court’s procedural due process decisions of the 1970s and
1980s failed to anticipate two developments with respect to the design of due
process procedures: first, that the space between the “generality of cases” and
the “rare exceptions” would become populated with subgroups of individuals
with procedural needs that differ from those of the typical individual; and,
second, that identifying and accommodating many of these subgroups would
become significantly less burdensome than ever before.  Taken together,
these two developments challenge the systemic view of procedural due pro-
cess that has dominated the doctrine for almost four decades.
This Part traces the rise of due process subgroups and the government’s
increasing ability to identify and accommodate the individuals who make up
these subgroups.  Section A provides an overview of the recent surge in due
process arguments on behalf of subgroups.  These arguments are being
raised by scholars, advocates, and policymakers, and they show no sign of
receding.  Looking across the range of new subgroup arguments, Section B
develops a typology of due process subgroups that classifies subgroups
according to their key distinguishing characteristics.  Finally, Section C exam-
ines the administrative environment in which subgroups exist and how that
environment has changed since the Supreme Court developed its systemic
approach to procedural due process.  In particular, Section C explores the
growing capacity of government agencies to gather, store, and use data that
115 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
116 See Walters, 473 U.S. at 330.
117 See id. at 326; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977).
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may enable them to identify and accommodate subgroups more easily than
when the Supreme Court last considered this aspect of the due process
calculus.
A. Due Process Subgroups Take Center Stage
The past decade has seen a sharp increase in the number of due process
arguments on behalf of subgroups.  Although these arguments follow the
Mathews framework, they typically elide the Supreme Court’s “generality of
cases” principle and its preference for one-size-fits-all procedures.  In fact,
most of the arguments do not contend with the “generality of cases” princi-
ple at all, moving directly to a weighing of the Mathews factors based only on
the facts of the subgroup.  Thus, notwithstanding the Court’s adoption of a
systemic approach to procedural due process, there has been a noticeable
turn towards disaggregation and differentiation based on factual variations
among individuals in a particular procedural context.
Immigration law has been a particularly fertile area for this new wave of
procedural due process arguments.118  In a wave of recent law review articles
and law student notes, commentators have identified various subgroups of
noncitizens appearing in immigration removal proceedings that, for reasons
specific to each subgroup, they argue are entitled to additional procedural
safeguards under the Due Process Clause.119  These subgroups of noncitizens
include asylum seekers,120 individuals who lack mental competency,121
118 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to immigration proceed-
ings. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (explaining that “[e]ven one whose presence in this country is
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [the] constitutional protection” of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100
(1903) (holding that due process applies to deportation procedures for lawfully admitted
noncitizens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“[I]t must be con-
cluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protec-
tion guaranteed by [the Fifth and Sixth Amendments], and that even aliens shall not . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”).
119 In addition to making due process arguments on behalf of specific subgroups,
immigration scholars have also made categorical due process arguments with respect to all
noncitizens in removal proceedings. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chaco´n, A Diversion of Attention?
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J.
1563, 1629–30 (2010) (arguing for a categorical due process right to appointed counsel in
immigration proceedings); Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed
Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 395 (2000) (same); Wil-
liam Haney, Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARV. INT’L L.J. 177, 185
(1970) (same).
120 See John R. Mills et al., “Death Is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 361, 363 (2009); Nimrod Pitsker, Comment, Due Process for All: Applying Eldridge
to Require Appointed Counsel for Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169, 171 (2007).
121 See Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due-Process Rights of Mentally Disabled
Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373, 377 (2011); Immigrant Rights &
Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1675–78 (2013); Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled
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juveniles and unaccompanied minors,122 lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gender (LGBT) children and young adults seeking asylum,123 individuals
who are statutorily eligible to seek relief from removal,124 lawful permanent
residents who are detained during their immigration proceedings,125 and all
lawful permanent residents.126  Each of these subgroups represents a fraction
of the total number of noncitizens appearing in immigration removal pro-
ceedings.127  Nonetheless, for each of these subgroups, the Mathews balanc-
ing test is invoked and applied128 using facts related only to that population
and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 26 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 523, 558 (2012); Helen Eisner, Comment, Disabled, Defenseless, and Still Deport-
able: Why Deportation Without Representation Undermines Due Process Rights of Mentally Disabled
Immigrants, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 511 (2011); Christopher Klepps, Note, What Kind of
“Process” Is This?: Solutions to the Case-by-Case Approach in Deportation Proceedings for Mentally
Incompetent Non-Citizens, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 545, 547 (2012); cf. Fatma E. Marouf, Incom-
petent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 929, 955 (2014) (suggesting that noncitizens with mental disabilities appearing
in removal proceedings have a procedural due process right to a competency
determination).
122 See Elizabeth M. Frankel, Detention and Deportation with Inadequate Due Process: The
Devastating Consequences of Juvenile Involvement with Law Enforcement for Immigrant Youth, 3
DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 63, 103–05 (2011); Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to be Heard:
Voicing the Due Process Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 41 (2011); Benjamin Good, Note, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 109, 128–47 (2014); cf. Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement,
supra note 121, at 1678–79 (arguing, without reference to Mathews, for a due process right
to appointed counsel for juvenile noncitizens in removal proceedings); Shani M. King,
Alone and Unrepresented: A Call to Congress to Provide Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors, 50
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331 (2013) (arguing for a right to appointed counsel for unaccompa-
nied minors in removal proceedings based on international law, not the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s due process guarantee).
123 See Susan Hazeldean, Confounding Identities: The Paradox of LGBT Children Under Asy-
lum Law, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 373, 417–32 (2011).
124 See Christen Chapman, Relief From Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1529, 1554–69 (2011); David A. Robertson, An Opportunity To Be Heard: The Right to
Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019 (1988).
125 See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for
Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 68
(2012); Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal
Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113 (2008).
126 See Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 121, at 1674–75; Kevin R.
Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013).
127 See, e.g., Hazeldean, supra note 123, at 378 n.14 (LGBT youth); Hill, supra note 122,
at 45 n.8 (unaccompanied minors); Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note
121, at 1675–76 (noncitizens with mental disabilities); Johnson, supra note 126, at 2413
(lawful permanent residents); Kaufman, supra note 125, at 115–16 (detained lawful perma-
nent residents); Mills et al., supra note 120, at 379 (asylum seekers). See generally EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK
(2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf.
128 As in other procedural due process contexts, courts use the Mathews balancing test
to determine what procedures are due in immigration removal proceedings. See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–37 (1982).
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of noncitizens.129  With the facts limited in this manner, the Mathews test
results in procedural safeguards that are different from those that are cur-
rently available to all noncitizens.130  The “generality of cases” principle and
the Court’s systemic approach to procedural due process typically go unmen-
tioned or underanalyzed despite the obvious challenge they pose to such a
disaggregated due process analysis.131
Similar procedural due process arguments are increasingly common in
other areas of law as well.  In the family law context, for example, commenta-
tors have singled out subgroups of children in divorce custody disputes that
involve allegations of child abuse and subgroups of children in termination
of parental rights proceedings, arguing that these subgroups are entitled to
more procedural protections than other children appearing in those pro-
ceedings.132  In the school discipline context, a commentator has argued for
129 See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 124, at 1560–69; Clapman, supra note 121, at 389–93;
Hazeldean, supra note 123, at 417–32; Hill, supra note 122, at 59–69; Immigrant Rights and
Immigration Enforcement, supra note 121, at 1675; Johnson, supra note 126, at 2403–14;
Kaplan, supra note 121, at 549–54; Mills et al., supra note 120, at 368–81; Robertson, supra
note 124, at 1034–37; Eisner, supra note 121, at 526–29; Good, supra note 122, at 128–47;
Kaufman, supra note 125, at 139–47; Klepps, supra note 121, at 568–69; Pitsker, supra note
120, at 185–97.
130 In most of the examples discussed above, commenters have argued that the addi-
tional procedural safeguard required under Mathews is court-appointed counsel. See, e.g.,
Frankel, supra note 122, at 105; Hill, supra note 122, at 69; Immigrant Rights and Immigration
Enforcement, supra note 121, at 1675–78; Johnson, supra note 126, at 2414; Kaplan, supra
note 121, at 549–54; Mills et al., supra note 120, at 371, 379; Noferi, supra note 125, at 120;
Robertson, supra note 124, at 1040; Eisner, supra note 121, at 529; Kaufman, supra note
125, at 145–47; Klepps, supra note 121, at 584; Pitsker, supra note 120, at 183.
However, some commentators have argued that other procedural safeguards are
required in addition to appointed counsel. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 124, at 1569–78;
Clapman, supra note 121, at 397–404; Hazeldean, supra note 123, at 432–41.
131 See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 124, at 1534; Frankel, supra note 122, at 103–05;
Immigrant Rights and Immigration Enforcement, supra note 121, at 1671; Johnson, supra note
126, at 2396; Kaplan, supra note 121, at 549; Mills et al., supra note 120, at 376; Robertson,
supra note 124, at 1020; Eisner, supra note 121, at 513; Kaufman, supra note 125, at 139;
Klepps, supra note 121, at 584.  But see Hill, supra note 122, at 68–69 (discussing the bene-
fits of a “[g]roup [r]ight” to expanded procedural safeguards); Clapman, supra note 121,
at 392–93; Pitsker, supra note 120, at 188.
To be fair, longstanding caselaw suggests that due process claims seeking government-
appointed counsel in immigration removal proceedings must be resolved on a case-by-case
basis. See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding
that noncitizens do not have a categorical right to government-appointed counsel in immi-
gration deportation proceedings, but noting that due process may require appointment of
counsel “[w]here an unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present his
position adequately to an immigration judge”). Aguilera-Enriquez was decided before
Mathews, however, and it did not address the Court’s preference for uniform procedural
rules.
132 See Sarah Dina Moore Alba, Comment, Searching for the “Civil Gideon”: Procedural
Due Process and the Juvenile Right to Counsel in Termination Proceedings, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1079 (2011) (discussing due process rights of children in termination of parental rights
proceedings); David Peterson, Comment, Judicial Discretion Is Insufficient: Minors’ Due Process
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expanded due process rights for students in jurisdictions that rely on the
criminal justice system, rather than traditional school disciplinary measures,
to maintain order in schools.133  In the housing law context, a commentator
has argued that individuals with mental disabilities who are facing eviction
from subsidized housing are entitled to additional procedural safeguards.134
And in the veterans’ benefits context, commentators have argued for
expanded due process rights for veterans whose eligibility is based on claims
of post-traumatic stress disorder, especially claims related to military sexual
trauma.135  As with the arguments on behalf of subgroups of noncitizens
appearing in immigration removal proceedings, the arguments in these wide-
ranging contexts dutifully apply the Mathews test but typically do not engage
with the “generality of cases” principle or the Court’s systemic view of proce-
dural due process.136
Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the type of disaggre-
gated due process arguments referenced above, such claims are working
their way through the lower courts.  Claims brought in the immigration con-
text are, not surprisingly, leading the way.  Noncitizens with mental disabili-
ties and unaccompanied noncitizen minors have brought class actions
seeking procedural safeguards in addition to those that are available to all
noncitizens appearing in removal proceedings.137  So too have classes of vet-
Right to Participate with Counsel When Divorce Custody Disputes Involve Allegations of Child Abuse,
25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1995) (discussing due process rights of children in child
custody disputes involving child abuse allegations).
133 See Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 864–65
(2012). See generally Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Developmental Due Process: Waging a Constitu-
tional Campaign to Align School Discipline with Developmental Knowledge, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 929,
960–65 (2009) (discussing the increasingly punitive nature of school discipline policies).
134 See Meghan P. Carter, How Evictions from Subsidized Housing Routinely Violate the Rights
of Persons with Mental Illness, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 118, 136–40 (2010).
135 See Brianne Ogilvie & Emily Tamlyn, Coming Full Circle: How VBA Can Complement
Recent Changes in DoD and VHA Policy Regarding Military Sexual Trauma, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 1
(2012); Ben Kappelman, Note, When Rape Isn’t Like Combat: The Disparity Between Benefits for
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder for Combat Veterans and Benefits for Victims of Military Sexual
Assault, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2011); Contessa M. Wilson, Note, Saving
Money, Not Lives: Why the VA’s Claims Adjudication System Denies Due Process to Veterans with
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and How the VA Can Avoid Judicial Intervention, 7 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 157, 178–83 (2010). See generally Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran:
What the Constitution Can Tell Us About the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501
(2011) (discussing due process and the veterans’ benefits system).
136 See Peterson, supra note 132, at 532–37; Carter, supra note 134, at 136–41; Alba,
supra note 132, at 1105–12; Wilson, supra note 135, at 180–81 (briefly mentioning the
“generality of cases” principle). But see Kim, supra note 134, at 896–97 (arguing that a
“reliance on generalities,” although “explicitly permissible” under Mathews, is nonetheless
inappropriate in the school discipline context).
137 See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG, 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2013) (involving a due process claim brought by class of unrepresented nonci-
tizens with severe mental disabilities appearing in removal proceedings); Gonzalez
Machado v. Ashcroft, No. CS-02-0066-FVS (E.D. Wash. June 18, 2002) (involving a due
process claim brought by class of unaccompanied minors appearing in immigration
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erans presenting post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms,138 public housing
tenants with mental disabilities challenging evictions,139 and individuals with
limited English proficiency challenging public benefits determinations.140
In all of these cases, the plaintiffs do not ask the court to order new procedu-
ral safeguards for everyone; rather, they demand that the existing procedures
be altered only for subgroup members in order to accommodate their atypi-
cal needs.
These types of due process claims have seen mixed outcomes thus far.
Although one court has found a due process violation,141 others have dis-
missed the due process claim on the merits,142 refused to consider the due
process claim due to a lack of jurisdiction,143 or granted relief on alternative
grounds without considering the due process claim.144  In the few decisions
that have reached the due process issue and applied the Mathews test to a
subgroup claim, the “generality of cases” principle has not received any criti-
cal analysis.145
At the same time that subgroup arguments have begun appearing in the
due process literature and in litigation, some government actors have inde-
removal proceedings); Complaint, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 2:14-cv-01026 (W.D. Wash. July
9, 2014) (involving a due process claim brought by class of unrepresented noncitizen
minors appearing in removal proceedings).
138 See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (involving a due process claim brought by veterans presenting post-traumatic stress
disorder symptoms); cf. Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (involving a
due process claim seeking additional procedural protections for individual suffering from
a psychiatric disorder).
139 See, e.g., Blatch v. Hernandez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 595, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving a
due process claim brought by a class of public housing tenants with mental disabilities).
140 See, e.g., Complaint, Ramirez v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ. 9287 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1999)
(involving a due process claim brought by class of food stamp applicants and recipients
with limited English proficiency).
141 See, e.g., Blatch, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (holding that local public housing authority’s
“practices and procedures for conducting administrative tenancy termination hearings fail
to protect mentally disabled tenants against deprivations of their tenancy rights without
due process of law”); cf. Edwards, 582 F.3d at 1355 (declining to reach the due process
claim of a veteran with a psychiatric disorder but observing that “[i]n some circumstances,
a mentally disabled applicant, known to be so disabled by VA, may receive additional pro-
tections while pursuing an application for benefits”).
142 See, e.g., Gonzalez Machado, No. CS-02-0066-FVS, slip op. at 12–22 (granting defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss a due process claim brought by unaccompanied minors appearing
in immigration removal proceedings).
143 See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1026–28 (dismissing, on jurisdictional
grounds unrelated to the merits, a due process claim seeking an expedited procedure for
veterans presenting post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms to receive access to mental
health care).
144 See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211, 2013 WL 3674492, at *3–10 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (granting relief on a separate claim but declining to reach the due
process claim).
145 See, e.g., Gonzalez Machado, No. CS-02-0066-FVS, slip op. at 12–22; Blatch, 360 F.
Supp. 2d at 640.
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pendently modified existing procedures to accommodate the needs of partic-
ular subgroups.  Congress,146 as well as some state and local legislatures,147
has proposed or passed legislation mandating procedural accommodations
for some of the subgroups mentioned above.  A handful of government agen-
cies have also promulgated regulations148 and altered internal policies149
146 See, e.g., William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5) (2012) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to “ensure, to the greatest extent practicable” that “all unaccompanied alien children . . .
have counsel to represent them in legal proceedings or matters”).  In addition, the immi-
gration reform bill recently passed by the Senate and currently under consideration in the
House of Representatives would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to include
special procedural safeguards (i.e., the right to appointed counsel) for subgroups consist-
ing of “unaccompanied alien children” and “aliens with a serious mental disability” appear-
ing in removal proceedings. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3502(c) (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013).
Similarly, a bill mandating appointed counsel in removal proceedings for “unaccompanied
alien child[ren]” and aliens who are rendered incompetent due to a “serious mental disa-
bility” was recently introduced in the House of Representatives. See Vulnerable Immigrant
Voice Act, H.R. 4936, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (introduced June 23, 2014).
147 See, e.g., Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a), (b)(7)
(West 2011) (providing funds for appointed counsel in civil cases “involving critical issues
affecting basic human needs,” and prioritizing cases based on inter alia, “[c]ase complex-
ity,” “[l]anguage issues,” “[d]isability access issues,” and “[t]he nature and severity of
potential consequences for the potential client if representation is not provided”); Press
Release, The Council of the City of New York, City Council Adopts Fiscal Year 2015 Budget
(June 25, 2014), http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/062514budget.shtml (announcing the
significant expansion of a city-funded program that provides legal representation to
detained noncitizens in removal proceedings).
148 For example, in 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs amended its regulations
in order to relax the veterans’ benefits evidentiary requirements for the subgroup consist-
ing of veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder based on fear of hostile military or ter-
rorist activity. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2013).  But cf. Petition for Review, Serv. Women’s
Action Network v. Gibson, No. 14-7115 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2014) (seeking to compel the
Department of Veterans Affairs to promulgate regulations establishing evidentiary accom-
modations for individuals seeking benefits based on post-traumatic stress disorder claims
related to military sexual trauma).  Other federal agencies have also modified their regula-
tions to ensure that the needs of subgroups are accommodated. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.15(i) (2012) (mandating interpreters for food stamp hearings).
149 See, e.g., Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of
Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
247, 257 (2010) (discussing efforts by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’
Office of Refugee Resettlement to increase legal representation for unaccompanied
minors in immigration removal proceedings); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to all ICE Employees (Apr. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/11063.1_current_id_and_infosharing_
detainess_mental_disorders.pdf (establishing special procedural safeguards for the sub-
group consisting of mentally incompetent noncitizens in immigration removal proceed-
ings); cf. Miguel A. Gradilla, Making Rights Real: Effectuating the Due Process Rights of
Particularly Vulnerable Immigrants in Removal Proceedings Through Administrative Mechanisms, 4
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 225 (2014) (arguing for promulgation of new regulations that would
safeguard the due process rights of “vulnerable immigrants” appearing in removal pro-
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that make similar adjustments to existing procedural regimes, and court sys-
tems have taken similar actions as well.150
B. Defining and Classifying Due Process Subgroups
In an effort to better understand what makes a subgroup a subgroup,
this Section offers a working definition and a typology of what this Article has
been referring to as due process subgroups.  Given the growing number of
subgroup arguments and the wide range of legal contexts in which they are
appearing, this effort is intended to distill the attributes that unite subgroups
across legal contexts, distinguish subgroups from “the generality of cases” in
a particular legal context, and explain what aspects of subgroups make them
potentially entitled to additional or substitute procedures under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.
Due process subgroups can be defined rather simply: they are identifi-
able cohorts of individuals who, because of some distinguishing characteris-
tic, may be entitled to additional or alternative procedural safeguards under
the traditional Mathews due process analysis.  The actual number of individu-
als who make up a subgroup will vary, but the size of the subgroup must be
smaller than the “large majority”151 or the “generality of cases”152 yet larger
than the “rare exceptions”153 in the relevant context.  Subgroup members
must be linked together by a shared characteristic that creates procedural
needs that differ from the needs of the “generality of cases.”  It is that distin-
guishing characteristic that creates the possibility that, under a Mathews anal-
ysis, the Due Process Clause will require procedural safeguards that differ
from those available to all individuals in the context.
At first glance, it may seem that subgroups merely represent ad hoc pleas
for special treatment for particularly favored or vulnerable subsets of the
population.  Yet through a careful review of the recent wave of subgroup
arguments, it is possible to sort subgroups according to the nature of the
distinguishing characteristic that links the members of each subgroup.  This
sorting gives rise to three distinct categories: (1) subgroups composed of
individuals who, due to their personal capacities and circumstances, are less
ceedings, defined as mentally incompetent noncitizens, unaccompanied noncitizen
minors, and detainees who raise asylum as a defense against removal).
150 For example, in 2007, the Supreme Court of Washington promulgated a new rule
that provides for accommodations, including court-appointed counsel, for unrepresented
parties with disabilities. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. G.R. 33(a)(i)(c) (West 2014).  Simi-
larly, the immigration court system has attempted to accommodate minors in removal pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Unaccompanied Alien Children in
Immigration Proceedings (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/08/Unac-
companiedAlienChildrenApr08.pdf (noting that “EOIR has established ‘juvenile dockets’
throughout the country to facilitate consistency, encourage child-friendly courtroom prac-
tices, and promote pro bono representation for unaccompanied alien children”).
151 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985).
152 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
153 Id.
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able to use the available procedures; (2) subgroups composed of individuals
who possess a stronger stake or interest in the proceedings; and (3) sub-
groups composed of individuals who are challenging a determination that is
unusually complex or complicated.  For each of these categories, the distin-
guishing characteristic creates procedural needs that are, by definition, not
shared by the typical or average individual.  Furthermore, because these dis-
tinguishing characteristics affect one or more of the Mathews factors, sub-
groups defined according to such characteristics raise questions about
whether one-size-fits-all procedural safeguards satisfy the due process rights
of subgroup members.
1. The Capacities and Circumstances of Subgroup Members
The first type of subgroup is composed of individuals who, due to their
shared capacities and circumstances, are less able to use the available proce-
dures than the rest of the individuals in a particular context.  It is therefore
reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Goldberg v. Kelly, later
repeated in Mathews v. Eldridge, that “[t]he opportunity to be heard must be
tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”154
Describing a category of subgroups in this manner is not to say that all mem-
bers of such subgroups are by definition helpless or powerless;155 rather, the
key is that their capacities and circumstances place them at a disadvantage in
comparison to the typical individual for whom the existing procedural safe-
guards were designed.
The recent wave of subgroup arguments has identified numerous sub-
groups that are defined according to the shared capacities and circumstances
of their members.  Due process arguments made on behalf of individuals
who suffer from mental disabilities or who lack mental competency are a
prime example.  These arguments, whether made in the context of immigra-
tion removal proceedings,156 eviction proceedings,157 or public benefit ter-
minations,158 all turn on the fact that these subgroup members, due to their
shared capacities and circumstances, are unable or less able to use the availa-
154 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970); see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (“All
that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to
‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.’” (quoting Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 268–69)).
155 See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 884 (1990) (critiquing Goldberg’s concept of tailoring and suggesting
that “it was the plaintiffs [in Goldberg] who made known their own capacities and
announced the terms on which they would be heard,” as “[i]t was the plaintiffs, and not
the Court, who tailored the real ‘hearing’ that Goldberg v. Kelly secured”).
156 See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211, 2013 WL 3674492, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2013); Clapman, supra note 121, at 373; Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforce-
ment, supra note 121, at 1674–79; Kaplan, supra note 121, at 523; Eisner, supra note 121, at
512; Klepps, supra note 121, at 547.
157 See, e.g., Blatch v. Hernandez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 595, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Carter,
supra note 134, at 136–40.
158 See, e.g., Lovely H. v. Eggleston, 235 F.R.D. 248, 250–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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ble procedural safeguards.  Arguments with respect to subgroups composed
of minor children appearing in procedural settings designed for adults follow
a similar pattern,159 as do arguments on behalf of individuals with limited
English proficiency.160
Not all capacities and circumstances cut across different procedural
regimes in the way that mental disabilities and lack of maturity do.  Indeed, a
subgroup may be defined by capacities and circumstances that are particular
to a specific context.  For example, in the context of welfare terminations, a
subgroup could be composed of individuals who are subject to work require-
ments and, due to their employment, are unable to appear at a daytime hear-
ing without jeopardizing their jobs.161  Or, returning to the immigration
context, a subgroup could consist of noncitizens who are held in immigra-
tion detention during the pendency of their removal proceedings, separated
from the lawyers and evidence they need to defend against deportation.162
Like the subgroups based on the trans-substantive capacities and circum-
stances identified above, members of context-specific subgroups share a char-
acteristic that puts them on unequal footing when they attempt to use the
available procedural safeguards.
Whether subgroups of this type are entitled to anything other than the
existing one-size-fits-all procedures will turn on the second and third Mathews
factors.  Subgroup members will need to be able to prove that their shared
capacities and circumstances place them at greater “risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation” and that “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would
159 See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 10–14, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 2:14-cv-01026 (W.D. Wash.
July 31, 2014); Frankel, supra note 122, at 103–05; Hazeldean, supra note 123, at 425–29;
Hill, supra note 122, at 59–69; Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 121,
at 1678–79; Good, supra note 122, at 128–47.  See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (recognizing the relevance of developmental psychology and neurobiology to the
constitutional rights of youth).
160 See Laura K. Abel, Language Access in the Federal Courts, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 603
(2013) (“A trial conducted in only English that concerns a person who cannot understand
or communicate in English is the epitome of a case lacking due process.”); Mary K. Gilles-
pie & Cynthia G. Schneider, Are Non-English-Speaking Claimants Served by Unemployment Com-
pensation Programs? The Need for Bilingual Services, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 333, 375–78
(1996) (discussing the rights of persons with limited English proficiency at unemployment
insurance hearings); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR LANGUAGE ACCESS IN COURTS 29
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_standards_for_language_access_proposal.authcheck
dam.pdf (urging courts to “ensure that persons with limited English proficiency have
meaningful access to all the services . . . provided by the court”).
161 See Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1349–52 (2012)
(discussing the predicament facing employed welfare recipients who seek to challenge a
termination or reduction of benefits at a fair hearing). See generally David A. Super, Are
Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051,
1088 (2005) (“Working claimants may lose more in wages (and their employer’s good will)
by attending [a fair hearing] than they would win from a successful result.”).
162 See Noferi, supra note 125, at 76–80; Kaufman, supra note 125, at 127–29.
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reduce that risk.163  They must also then demonstrate that the cost of provid-
ing such safeguards does not outweigh the other Mathews factors.164  Only
then will this type of due process subgroup overcome the Supreme Court’s
preference for uniform procedural rules.
2. The Private Interest at Stake
A second type of subgroup is composed of individuals who possess a
stronger stake or interest in the proceedings than the typical individual.  The
private interest affected by a government action surely varies from person to
person; after all, it would be difficult to imagine a constitutionally protected
interest being of identical value to any two people.  However, beyond such
anticipated minor variations, there may be subgroups of individuals who
share an interest in the proceedings that is demonstrably stronger than the
interest at issue in the “generality of cases.”
Subgroups based on a heightened private interest can be found in a vari-
ety of contexts.  In contested divorce proceedings, children may possess a
greater private interest when there are allegations of child abuse than when
there are no such allegations.165  In school discipline proceedings, the pri-
vate interest may be greater for students who will be subject to unusually
severe corporal punishment166 or criminal prosecution167 for their alleged
misbehavior.  In immigration proceedings, lawful permanent residents and
refugees may possess a stronger interest in remaining in the United States
than noncitizens who lack similar ties,168 or who do not fear death or perse-
cution if forced to return to their home countries.169
163 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
164 See id. (identifying the third Mathews factor as “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail”).
165 See Peterson, supra note 132, at 515.
166 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) (considering the due process
rights of students who were subjected to severe paddlings by school officials).
167 See Kim, supra note 133, at 862–63 (discussing the situation of students enrolled in
schools that have adopted school discipline policies that are more criminal than educa-
tional in nature).
168 See Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, supra note 121, at 1675 (“[T]here is
arguably a greater private interest at stake for [lawful permanent residents] given their
already strong ties to the United States.”); Johnson, supra note 126, at 2404–06 (“The inter-
ests at stake are especially high for the average lawful permanent resident in removal pro-
ceedings, as compared to the ordinary noncitizen who entered without inspection or
overstayed a visa.”).  The Supreme Court has recognized the heightened stakes when law-
ful permanent residents face removal from the United States. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop
the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
169 See Mills et al., supra note 120, at 363; Pitsker, supra note 120, at 185.  The Supreme
Court has recognized the heightened stakes when noncitizens claim refugee status. See
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (“Deportation is always a harsh measure;
it is all the more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be
subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home country.”).
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To obtain different procedural protections under the Due Process
Clause, members of this type of subgroup must focus on the first factor of the
Mathews test: “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action.”170  Thus, these subgroup members will need to be able to establish
that their private interest in the proceedings is, in fact, stronger than the
private interest at stake in the “generality of cases.”  In addition, as with all
subgroup types, to tip the Mathews balance in their favor, members of these
subgroups will need to demonstrate that the cost of the additional procedu-
ral safeguards they seek does not outweigh the other two Mathews factors.171
3. The Complexity of the Determination
A third type of subgroup is composed of individuals who are challenging
a determination that is unusually complex or complicated.  This subgroup
type is likely to appear in decisionmaking contexts in which the issues and
determinations are straightforward in most, but not all, cases.  A common
distinction along these lines involves differences between determinations that
hinge on issues of fact or law.  Many factual issues—the who, what, when, and
where of a past event—can seem relatively simple when compared to legal
issues that involve complicated statutory or regulatory regimes.  It is also pos-
sible that among the factual issues that arise in a particular context, some will
be more complex than others, for example, issues that involve medical
reports or expert testimony.
Like the other two subgroup categories, subgroups based on the com-
plexity of the determination arise in many different contexts.  For example,
efforts have been made to carve out subgroups of veterans’ benefits cases
involving post-traumatic stress disorder claims generally,172 as well as a subset
of claims related to military sexual trauma,173 as those types of claims are
significantly harder to prove, as a factual matter, than run-of-the-mill claims
for veterans’ benefits.  Subgroups of complex cases have also been identified
in the context of immigration removal proceedings.  There, noncitizens fac-
ing removal based on prior criminal charges often must contend with
“extraordinarily complicated legal issues,”174 in contrast with the “large
majority” of noncriminal immigration proceedings that “involve much sim-
pler deportability determinations: whether someone entered the country ille-
170 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
171 See id.
172 See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (due process claim brought by class of veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder
who were eligible for or receiving medical services).
173 See, e.g., Petition for Review at 2–3, Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Gibson, No.
14-7115 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2014) (discussing reasons why military sexual trauma survivors
face “higher hurdles to obtaining VA benefits” than other veterans); Ogilvie & Tamlyn,
supra note 135, at 35–39; Kappelman, supra note 135, at 546–47.
174 Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1359 (2011)
(discussing the need to determine the complicated ways in which “federal immigration law
maps onto the criminal code of a given state”).
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gally or whether they have stayed beyond the period authorized upon
admission.”175  And among noncitizens whose proceedings do not involve
criminal charges, subgroups of individuals who are statutorily eligible to seek
relief from removal also face atypically difficult challenges that distinguish
their cases from the “generality of cases.”176
As with due process claims brought by subgroups defined according to
their members’ shared capacities and circumstances, claims brought by sub-
groups facing unusually complex cases will turn on the second and third
Mathews factors.  Subgroup members will need to be able to prove that the
complexity of their cases increases “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” and
that “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would reduce that
risk.177  They must also then establish that the cost of such safeguards does
not outweigh the other Mathews factors.178
C. Identifying and Accommodating Due Process Subgroups
Any argument that subgroups should be accommodated under the Due
Process Clause must contend with the systemic view of due process developed
by the Supreme Court in Mathews and subsequent decisions.179  In rejecting
a more tailored approach to procedural due process, the Court expressed
concerns about the government’s ability to identify and accommodate indi-
viduals in need of additional or alternative procedural safeguards.  Ruling
almost thirty years ago, the Court assumed that imposing such obligations
would be impracticable, unduly burdensome, and exceedingly costly.180
These concerns were consistent with the Court’s cost-benefit approach to
procedural due process, which identifies the burden on the government as
one of the three factors that courts must consider when determining the
requirements of procedural due process.181
At the risk of stating the obvious, things have changed since the 1970s
and 1980s in ways that directly affect the government’s ability to identify and
175 Id.
176 For example, individuals who are statutorily eligible to seek relief from removal may
contend with demands for extensive documentation, expert testimony in support of their
claims, and legal arguments based on a notoriously complex statutory and regulatory
regime. See Robertson, supra note 124. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369
(2010) (“Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own.”); Baltazar-
Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]mmigration laws have been termed
second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.”).
177 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
178 See id. (identifying the third Mathews factor as “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail”).
179 See supra Section I.A.
180 See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326, 349 (1985);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680, 682 n.55 (1977).
181 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35 (identifying “the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail” as one of the three
factors courts must consider).
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accommodate subgroup members.  Government agencies have increasingly
moved beyond labor-intensive, paper-based processes for obtaining and stor-
ing information about their constituents,182 and the emergence of new tech-
nologies has revolutionized the ways in which agencies manage and process
information.183  Despite growing and legitimate concerns about privacy,
accuracy, confidentiality, and security,184 this transformation is showing no
signs of slowing down.
Government agencies have always collected personal information about
their constituents.  In the course of administering many of the property inter-
ests that trigger due process protection, agencies gather a wide range of
information about the individuals who possess those interests.  Indeed,
means-tested public benefit programs such as welfare, food stamps, and
Medicaid are notorious for demanding that claimants turn over large
amounts of personal information.185  But, more generally, just about any
182 See, e.g., STAN DORN & ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, MOVING TO 21ST-CENTURY PUBLIC
BENEFITS: EMERGING OPTIONS, GREAT PROMISE, AND KEY CHALLENGES 2 (2012), http://www
.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/Moving-to-21st-Century-Public-Benefits.pdf
(observing that “eligibility determination for assistance in the past was largely paper-
driven”); id. at 3 (referring to “the traditional model of extended one-on-one interaction
between caseworker and client”).
183 See id. at 4 (“The world has changed, and a new model of public benefit administra-
tion is emerging.”); see also CARI DESANTIS & SARAH FASS HIATT, DATA SHARING IN PUBLIC
BENEFIT PROGRAMS: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR REMOVING BARRIERS 4 (2012), http://www
.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/Data-Sharing-in-Public-Benefit-Programs.pdf
(explaining that “[i]n recent years, there have been dramatic changes across the landscape
of public benefit programs with the emergence of significant technological capability in
information systems”).
184 See DESANTIS & HIATT, supra note 183, at 10 (discussing “[q]uestions regarding data
privacy, confidentiality, and security”); DORN & LOWER-BASCH, supra note 182, at 15–16
(discussing “serious problems” created by use of inaccurate or incomplete data to deter-
mine eligibility, and the need for “careful attention to privacy and data security”); cf. Dani-
elle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008) (discussing the
dangers created by government agencies’ increasing use of automated decisionmaking
systems).
185 To establish eligibility for welfare benefits, for example, applicants must provide
extensive information and documentation:
A typical applicant for welfare, called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), must undergo a multistage, multiday application process consisting of
screening interviews, application interviews, group orientations, and
employability assessments.  She must answer questions ranging from her
resources and sustenance needs to her psychological well-being.  Her own word is
not enough; she must also provide independent verification of her answers to
many of these questions, either through her own documentation or through
information gathered from third parties, and in some cases, caseworkers conduct
investigations themselves.  As part of TANF, an applicant must also comply with
child support enforcement efforts by providing detailed paternity information
about her children.
Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389,
1397–98 (2012) (footnotes omitted).  Thus, “the poor are often subject to humiliating and
stigmatizing data collection practices.” Id. at 1427.
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interaction with a government agency requires individuals to disclose per-
sonal information to the government.
Although the government’s collection of personal data is not a new
development, its ability to store and access that data is unprecedented.  In
the past, personal information was recorded and kept in paper records and
files, which could then be available for inspection at only one place at a time.
But today, with the shift from paper files to electronic files, and from file
cabinets and storage sites to virtual data warehouses, the government is able
to retain and retrieve a seemingly unlimited amount of information.186
Thus, in ways that were never possible before, government agencies can now
easily view, sort, group, and analyze personal information across entire popu-
lations of individuals.
The government’s growing capacity to collect and store personal infor-
mation is only half the story, however.  What makes these developments even
more powerful are the new ways in which agencies can share this information
with one another.  Within just the past decade, governmental entities across
the country have adopted computer systems that enable them to share the
vast amounts of information and records accumulating in their databases.187
Agencies cross-referencing information with one another is not an entirely
new phenomenon,188 but recent years have seen a sharp increase in the
amount of information that is available to be shared and the capacity of agen-
cies to share that information.189  As a result, the information gathered
through applications and eligibility determinations for government benefits
and services remains available to the agencies that collected the information
as well as other agencies that are connected to that data.190  While this type
186 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 137,
142 (2008) (“Developments in data storage technology now make indefinite data retention
feasible for businesses and individuals alike.”); Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist
Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 481 (2013) (“The amount of information that a modern
database can hold and the ease with which that information can be transferred, manipu-
lated, and combined is unprecedented . . . .”).
187 See Bernstein, supra note 186, at 481 (“Networked information storage has made it
easier for information in one database to be shared with new users, put to new uses, and
combined with information from other sources.”); see also AM. PUB. HUM. SERVS. ASS’N,
BRIDGING THE DIVIDE: LEVERAGING NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO INTEGRATE HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES 5 (2011) (“Unlike even a decade ago, today’s technology can enable seamless
interoperability of data exchange, program coordination, case management and business
work flow process, even while maintaining security and privacy requirements.”).
188 See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verifi-
cation Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 672
(2005) (discussing, in the context of Medicaid eligibility determinations, “workers using
computer-matching [to] check information reported in public and private databases”).
189 See DORN & LOWER-BASCH, supra note 182, at 5 (“Public agencies and their contrac-
tors are gaining access . . . to ever-increasing amounts of information about household
income and other characteristics potentially relevant to eligibility.”).
190 See id. at 13 (“When electronic case records or data warehouses store eligibility-
related information, multiple programs can access that information.”).
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of information sharing is most common between agencies at the local191 and
state level,192 state and federal agencies have also developed information-
sharing arrangements,193 as have some state agencies and court systems.194
Putting it all together, the task of identifying and accommodating mem-
bers of particular subgroups looks much different today than it did when the
Supreme Court developed its systemic approach to procedural due process.
Government agencies now possess unprecedented capacity to collect, store,
analyze, retrieve, and share an ever-expanding universe of data concerning
the individuals they serve.  While these developments have resulted in harm-
191 For example, New York City is developing a database that “links together vast
amounts of information gathered by city agencies that previously maintained their files
separately,” such as the city’s child welfare agency, its homeless services agency, its public
housing authority, its agency that administers safety-net benefits, and its agency that
administers rent subsidies for senior citizens. See Anemona Hartocollis, Promise and Con-
cern for a Vast Social Services Database on the City’s Neediest, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A31.
“[T]housands of workers in nine city agencies will have access to the information, includ-
ing employees from Family Court, legal services, child protection, the Department for the
Aging, corrections, public hospitals and domestic violence prevention.” Id.  As of 2011,
similar projects were being developed in Montgomery County, Maryland, and Alameda
County, California. Id.
192 For example, Utah has implemented a system, called Electronic Resource and Eligi-
bility Product (e-REP), that is designed to enable state agencies “to share data and applica-
tions throughout programs and services that include unemployment insurance, worker’s
compensation, employment services, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
food stamps, child care, child welfare and child support enforcement, Medicaid and
mental health.” See Dibya Sarkar, Utah Takes an Integrated Approach to Human Services, FCW:
THE BUS. OF FED. TECH. (Apr. 17, 2006), http://fcw.com/articles/2006/04/17/utah-takes-
an-integrated-approach-to-human-services.aspx; see also DESANTIS & HIATT, supra note 183,
at 7 (describing Louisiana’s use of data sharing).
193 See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 361 (2005) (describing, in
the context of child support enforcement, a nationwide “system of tracking and collecting
information on fathers who owe child support that ‘creates a detailed profile of who you
are, what you do and what you are likely to do.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Samuel V.
Schoonmaker, IV, Consequences and Validity of Family Law Provisions in the “Welfare Reform
Act,” 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 1, 51 (1997))); Robert Pear, Vast Worker Database to Track
Deadbeat Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at A1 (describing the national directory of new
hires).  Some of the information-sharing between the federal government and state gov-
ernments is mandated by federal statute. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 653a (2012) (mandating a
new hire directory); 42 U.S.C. § 654a (mandating a central registry for child support
cases); 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(M) (mandating a national paternity database); see also Tonya
L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 262 (2000) (discussing the
“interconnected, computerized databases on the state and national level” required by the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996).
194 See, e.g., Jonathan Walters, Social Services’ Challenge of Sharing Data, GOVERNING: THE
STATES AND LOCALITIES (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-
services/col-challenge-sharing-data-human-services.html (describing an arrangement
between the Michigan Department of Human Services and the state court system through
which the state shares data “in a host of areas like adoption status, reunification and length
of stay in state custody”).
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ful outcomes for many individuals, particularly low-income people of
color,195 they do offer new possibilities for tailoring procedural regimes to
meet the needs of subgroups.
In light of these changes, the idea that identifying and accommodating
subgroup members is necessarily impracticable or unduly burdensome, as
the Supreme Court has suggested, appears to be increasingly outdated.  In
the 1970s and 1980s, the task of identifying subgroup members would have
likely required government employees to gather paper case files from wher-
ever they were stored, read each file page by page looking for relevant infor-
mation, document the results of that search, and bring the results to other
government officials involved in the proceeding that was about to take
place.196  Today, using the vast, networked computer databases discussed
above, it is possible that each of those steps could be accomplished with the
push of a few buttons.197  And even if an agency does not already possess
information with respect to a subgroup’s distinguishing characteristics, the
burden of collecting that information is much smaller than it would have
been in the past.  To be sure, advances in technology cannot help to identify
all subgroups, and not all government agencies are taking full advantage of
the technological advances that are available to them.  But the larger point
remains: the administrative burden associated with identifying and accommo-
dating subgroups is shrinking and will continue to shrink in many different
contexts.  Accordingly, for some subgroups, the third Mathews factor—the
fiscal and administrative burden of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards198—is now significantly smaller than it would have been when the
Court last considered this aspect of procedural due process.
195 See Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support, 25
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 23), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383908 (discussing “regulatory intersec-
tionality” and how information gathered by social welfare systems can be accessed and used
by more punitive systems); see also KAARYN GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSIS-
TANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 57 (2011) (arguing that “the collection of
biometric data scrutinizes and stigmatizes low-income adults in a way that equates poverty
with criminality”); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 113, 131 (2011) (observing that social safety net programs require that “poor
women’s private lives [be] made available for state surveillance and . . . punitive state
responses”). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2000) (describing the “intense concern about the
personal and social implications of such databases—now, in digital form, capable of being
rapidly searched, instantly distributed, and seamlessly combined with other data sources to
generate ever more comprehensive records of individual attributes and activities”).
196 Cf. Hartocollis, supra note 191, at A31 (explaining, in the context of searching for
information about missing children, that “[n]ot long ago, the agency would have had to
find the children the old-fashioned way, by combing through paper records, sending let-
ters to other agencies and issuing an Amber alert”).
197 See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text.
198 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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III. DUE PROCESS DISAGGREGATION
Despite the recent rise of due process subgroups, they remain largely
absent from due process doctrine.  The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
a claim that the Due Process Clause requires additional or alternative proce-
dural safeguards for members of a subgroup.  Nor have lower courts or legal
scholars thoroughly analyzed this aspect of procedural due process.  Put sim-
ply, there is no consensus on the due process rights of subgroups of individu-
als that can be characterized as neither “the generality of cases” nor “the rare
exceptions.”
The resulting uncertainty about the due process rights of subgroups is
having real consequences.  Lower courts ruling on due process claims
brought by subgroups lack a clear and consistent way to evaluate those
claims.  Government agencies seeking to establish and maintain procedural
regimes that comport with due process requirements are unable to do so
when the status of subgroup due process rights is so unsettled.  And, to the
extent that subgroup claims are perceived to be unsound under Supreme
Court caselaw, subgroup members may believe that the only way to vindicate
their rights is to go it alone, bringing claims on behalf of just themselves
rather than the rest of the members of their subgroup.  Such individual chal-
lenges are costly, both for the subgroup members who bring them as well as
the government agencies that defend against them and the courts that adju-
dicate them.
This Part examines the due process rights of subgroup members.  Based
on a review of the Supreme Court’s precedents concerning the meaning and
scope of the Due Process Clause, this Part argues that interpreting due pro-
cess to require the accommodation of subgroups in certain situations fits
within well-established due process doctrine.  It then considers three poten-
tial objections to such a disaggregated approach to procedural due process:
that accommodating the needs of subgroups will create a sense of unfairness
and arbitrariness, that it will cause practical difficulties, and that the reliance
on constitutional rights brings significant risks and limitations.  This Part
concludes by considering the vital role of experimentation and empirical
research with respect to the future of due process subgroups.
A. Fitting Subgroups into Due Process Doctrine
As discussed in Section I.A, the Supreme Court’s initial wave of post-
Mathews decisions largely overlooked the possibility that subgroups of individ-
uals may have different procedural needs than the average or typical individ-
ual in a particular context.  Since turning its attention to the precise contours
of due process in the early 1970s, the Court has emphasized that due process
rules must be shaped by the facts associated with “the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions.”199  Aside from one foray into a case-by-case approach to
199 Id. at 344.
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due process rules,200 the Court has applied the Mathews test to the facts of
the “typical,” “usual,” or “large majority” of cases in whichever context it is
reviewing.201  This view of procedural due process—with its focus on “the
generality of cases” as opposed to “the rare exceptions”—does not account
for subgroups of individuals whose cases differ from the “generality of cases”
in ways that affect one or more of the Mathews factors.
Despite the absence of subgroups from due process doctrine, the
Court’s prior decisions offer clues as to how such a claim should be analyzed.
The Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that overcoming the “generality of
cases” principle is possible, but it requires a “very difficult factual show-
ing.”202  Such a showing would presumably hinge on whether the administra-
tive burden associated with identifying and accommodating subgroup
members is outweighed by the other two Mathews factors.  Thus, while the
Court reaffirmed the “generality of cases” principle in a series of cases
decided during the decade following Mathews,203 it did not completely dis-
miss the notion that the Due Process Clause could require different procedu-
ral rules for members of a subgroup.204
After twenty-five years of silence on this aspect of procedural due pro-
cess, the Court’s recent decision in Turner v. Rogers sheds new light on the
due process rights of subgroups.205 Turner involved a due process challenge
to a state’s refusal to provide appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceed-
ing that could result in the plaintiff’s imprisonment.206  Applying the
Mathews test, the Court found that the plaintiff’s due process rights had been
violated but declined to create a new right to appointed counsel.207  Instead,
200 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
201 See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985)
(explaining that “a process which is sufficient for the large majority of a group of claims is
by constitutional definition sufficient for all of them”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
677–78 (1977) (focusing the due process analysis on what “usually” prompts corporal pun-
ishment in schools and the “typically insignificant” risk of error); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342
(focusing the due process analysis on the “typical[ ]” disability benefits claimant).
202 Walters, 473 U.S. at 330.  The Walters Court reviewed a lower court order modifying
due process procedures for all claimants in the veterans’ benefits context, not just a sub-
group of claimants. See id. at 316 (discussing the scope of the injunction issued by the
district court).  Nonetheless, the Court briefly discussed a hypothetical due process claim
on behalf of only those claimants whose cases were “complex.” See id. at 330.
203 See Walters, 473 U.S. at 330; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 615 (1979); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 680; see also supra Section I.A.
204 See Walters, 473 U.S. at 337 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “[t]he ‘determi-
nation of what process is due [may] var[y]’ with regard to a group whose ‘situation differs’
in important respects from the typical veterans’ benefit claimant” (quoting Parham, 442
U.S. at 617)).
205 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
206 See id. at 2512.
207 See id. at 2520 (“In our view, a categorical right to counsel in proceedings of the
kind before us would carry with it disadvantages (in the form of unfairness and delay) that,
in terms of ultimate fairness, would deprive it of significant superiority over the alternatives
that we have mentioned.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 39  8-DEC-14 14:48
2014] due  process  disaggregation 321
the Court identified various “substitute procedural safeguards” that, if made
available to the plaintiff, would satisfy due process.208
The Turner Court did not invoke the “generality of cases” principle, nor
did it suggest that it was creating a new one-size-fits-all standard.  Instead, the
Court clarified that its holding does not address the due process rights of
individuals subject to civil contempt proceedings whose cases are “unusually
complex” or whose adversary is the government.209  Thus, the Supreme
Court’s most recent pronouncement on procedural due process rights
appears to contemplate that subgroups of individuals may be entitled to dif-
ferent procedural safeguards.
This apparent shift away from a one-size-fits-all approach to procedural
due process should dissuade courts from simply brushing aside the current
wave of due process subgroup claims.  As defined in Section II.B, subgroups
that are based on the capacities and circumstances of subgroup members,
the complexity of their cases, and the heightened interests at stake, all pre-
sent facts that affect one or more of the Mathews factors in ways that are
different from “the generality of cases.”210  Furthermore, the government’s
shift towards digitizing unprecedented amounts of information and its
increasing use of massive networked computer databases challenge old
assumptions about the administrative burden associated with identifying and
accommodating subgroup members.211
To be clear, merely fitting into one of the categories proposed by this
Article does not guarantee that a subgroup will be entitled to different proce-
dures under the Due Process Clause.  The universe of potential subgroups is
too vast, and the facts of each subgroup too specific, to make any predictions.
Rather, the argument here is that subgroup members should have the oppor-
tunity to argue and prove that the facts related to their cases alter the
Mathews balance to such an extent that they are entitled to additional or
alternative procedural safeguards.  In other words, courts should not dismiss
208 Id. at 2519.  As the Court noted:
Those safeguards include (1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a
critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the
equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at the
hearing for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his
financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an
express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay.
Id.
209 Id. at 2520.
210 See supra Section II.B.
211 See supra Section II.C.  In addition, in the years since Mathews, agencies at all levels
of government have become increasingly familiar with identifying and accommodating the
needs of certain subsets of the population. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012);
Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2012); Exec. Order No.
13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 16, 2000); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012); 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.405(d)(1) (2013).
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such claims simply because they are based on something other than the “gen-
erality of cases.”
This disaggregated approach to due process is not foreclosed even in
contexts in which a one-size-fits-all procedural regime has already been held
to satisfy the Due Process Clause.  The Supreme Court has long acknowl-
edged that due process rules may evolve over time.212  As the Court has
explained, “[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concep-
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”213
Thus, when subgroups present facts and circumstances that differ from those
presented by the typical case in ways that alter the Mathews balance, the
requirements of due process must adapt to those changes.214  Indeed, requir-
ing the accommodation of such subgroups is the only way to ensure that the
fundamental requirement of due process—the opportunity to be heard “at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”215—is satisfied for more than
just the average or typical individuals in each context in which due process
applies.
Finally, arguing that one-size-fits-all procedural rules are insufficient for
a subgroup of individuals is merely the first step toward securing procedures
that are adequately tailored for subgroup members.  Next, a court must iden-
tify precisely how subgroup members should be accommodated.  Although
the “additional or substitute procedural safeguards”216 will depend on the
specific context and the result of the Mathews analysis, courts, policymakers,
212 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (stating that procedural rules, “even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions
of due process”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(explaining that the concept of due process is “perhaps, the least frozen concept of our
law—the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a
progressive society”); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528–29 (1884) (expressing fear
that establishing a fixed definition of due process would “stamp upon our jurisprudence
the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians”).
213 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, as the Court has
explained, “[i]t has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of
authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the partic-
ular situation demands.”  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); accord Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14–15, n.15 (1978); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334;
see also Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(“The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation.”).
214 See Parkin, supra note 161, at 1360–76 (arguing that the requirements of due pro-
cess must adapt to new facts and circumstances); cf. Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and
Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 341 (1957)
(“Freezing the meaning of due process, which in the final analysis is more a moral com-
mand than a strictly jural precept, destroys the chief virtue of its generality: its elasticity.”).
215 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).
216 Id. at 335.
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and scholars have already begun to propose and experiment with potential
procedural accommodations.217
The range of possible accommodations for due process subgroups is
both broad and evolving.  At one end of the spectrum is the right to court-
appointed counsel, which has been the reform most commonly sought by
proponents of due process subgroups.218  But meaningful procedural accom-
modations do not necessarily require full representation by a lawyer.  There
may be contexts in which the assistance of a non-lawyer representative or a
“lawyer for the day” is sufficient.219  Or, as the Supreme Court suggested in
Turner v. Rogers, due process might be assured through enhanced notices and
forms, targeted hearings, and express findings by the courts.220  In line with
Turner, scholars have identified meaningful reforms that could be accom-
plished without an influx of new lawyers.221  Such proposals have included
expanding the role of judges and court clerks,222 modifying the burdens of
production and proof,223 simplifying procedural rules,224 and adopting
217 See supra Section II.A.
218 See, e.g., supra note 130 (identifying scholars who have argued in favor of a due
process right to court-appointed counsel for subgroups in the immigration removal
context).
219 See Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2241 (1999); Wallace B. Jefferson, Liberty and Justice for Some: How the Legal System Falls Short
in Protecting Basic Rights, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1953, 1965–81 (2013); Richard Zorza & David
Udell, New Roles for Non-Lawyers to Increase Access to Justice, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259,
1293–98 (2014).
220 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
221 See, e.g., Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 49) (on file with author) (arguing in favor of
“‘demand side’ reform of the courts as an alternative, or complementary, theory of access
to justice, one that improves fairness and due process for the unrepresented without an
increase in the presence of attorneys”).
222 See, e.g., Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ in Assisting the
Pro Se Litigant, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDCIARY 447 (2007); Russell Engler, And Justice
for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for
Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges
Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 977 (2004); Steinberg, supra note 221, at 63–65.
Although not aimed exclusively at the needs of subgroup members, improvements to court
systems—for example, creating self-help centers and special courts for pro se litigants and
permitting clerks’ offices to give limited advice—could ameliorate some of the problems
facing subgroups. See RICHARD ZORZA, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELF-HELP
FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS
49 (2002); Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA.
L. REV. 1227, 1273 (2010); Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1581 (2002).
223 See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2013) (establishing relaxed veterans’ benefits evidentiary
requirements for the subgroup consisting of veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder
based on a fear of hostile military or terrorist activity); Fiddelman, supra note 105, at 458.
224 See, e.g., Fiddelman, supra note 105, at 458; Steinberg, supra note 221, at 58–60.
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plain-language form pleadings.225  The menu of potential accommodations
is constantly expanding, as technological developments offer new and better
ways to ensure that subgroup members receive due process of law.226  Thus,
interpreting the Due Process Clause to require accommodation of subgroups
will create new opportunities for procedural innovation and
experimentation.
B. Potential Objections to a Disaggregated Approach to Procedural Due Process
Interpreting the Due Process Clause to account for the needs of sub-
groups may trigger a number of reasonable objections.  For example, grant-
ing subgroup members additional or alternative procedural safeguards may
engender a sense of unfairness or even arbitrariness among non-subgroup
members.  Implementing different procedures for subgroups and requiring
judges to determine which individuals receive those procedures may create
significant practical challenges for courts and government agencies.  And
constitutionalizing the procedural due process rights of subgroups may result
in little actual benefit—and possibly some harm—to subgroup members.
This Section addresses each of these potential objections in turn.
1. Unfairness and Arbitrariness
Any shift away from one-size-fits-all procedures in a particular context
runs the risk of creating an impression of unfairness.227  It is not difficult to
imagine that individuals who are not offered the same additional or alterna-
tive procedural safeguards that are made available to subgroup members may
feel like victims of arbitrary decisions or even favoritism.228  This would be a
225 See Charles R. Dyer et al., Improving Access to Justice: Plain Language Family Law Court
Forms in Washington State, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1065 (2013).
226 Cf. Barton, supra note 222, at 1273 (“If any thought or effort is put into combining
technology with the needs of pro se courts and litigants, something truly revolutionary
might emerge.”).
227 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 50 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that varying procedural safeguards within a particular context can diminish “the
predictability and uniformity that underlie our society’s commitment to the rule of law”).
228 See Lee, supra note 82, at 984 (“Nothing . . . invites the impression of arbitrariness
more than treating similarly situated people differently . . . .”).  According to Lee, when
procedural safeguards vary within the context of public benefit programs, “the recipient of
benefits will often believe first, that favoritism, rather than rule, fuels the distribution of
procedural protection, and second, that had the recipient received the same process
afforded others, the result in his case would have been different.” Id. at 985.  Of course,
individuals may define fairness differently. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology
of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 175 (2011) (“[T]he very basis
of the psychology of procedural justice—measuring subjective perceptions of fairness—
suggests the limitations of a one-size-fits-all template for procedural fairness.”). See generally
Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121 (2000)
(identifying “four elements of procedures [that] are the primary factors that contribute to
judgements about their fairness”).  The grouping of certain individuals but not others
within a subgroup could also be viewed as arbitrary. Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S.
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troubling consequence of subgroup accommodation, especially because the
concept of due process of law is commonly understood as a bulwark against
unfairness and arbitrariness.229
Yet disaggregating due process and accommodating the needs of sub-
groups is not, and need not necessarily be perceived as, unfair or arbitrary.
Procedural rules that apply uniformly to everyone in a particular context are
appropriate when the individuals in that context are similarly situated.230
Subgroup members, in contrast, may have different procedural rights
because they are unlike the typical individual.  Indeed, subgroup members
will be entitled to different procedures only when such differences are sub-
stantial enough to tip the Mathews balance in favor of subgroup accommoda-
tion.  Because these differences reveal that subgroup members and non-
subgroup members are not similarly situated, moving away from one-size-fits-
all procedures in those contexts would be justified.231
Moreover, current due process doctrine already contemplates these
types of distinctions.  The Supreme Court acknowledged this issue in Turner
v. Rogers, when it observed that the Due Process Clause may require different
procedural safeguards for individuals whose civil contempt cases are “unusu-
ally complex.”232  Similarly, courts and administrative agencies are accus-
Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2007)
(discussing the “reference class problem”—the challenge of making principled classifica-
tions of people according to certain characteristics); Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution
to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2081 (2009) (proposing a solution to the
reference class problem in legal contexts).
229 See Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus, supra note 96, at 52–54 (discuss-
ing the role of “equality of treatment” in the realm of adjudicatory procedure); Redish &
Marshall, supra note 96, at 483–85 (discussing the role of fairness and equality in procedu-
ral due process); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that due process “[r]epresent[s] a profound
attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual
and government”).
230 See Kim, supra note 133, at 897 (“[T]he primary purpose of uniform, categorical
rules is to ensure that ‘similarly situated litigants are treated equally.’” (quoting Evan H.
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmak-
ing, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (1994))).
231 See Kim, supra note 133, at 897 (“Where the facts show that litigants are not, in fact,
similarly situated in a legally significant way, the application of the same rule to them is no
longer appropriate.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedu-
ral Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1681–82 (1992)
(“It does not necessarily violate procedural due process to discriminate in the procedures
that are afforded, since the differences may be justified.”); White, supra note 155, at 877
(“Fairness may require more than the even-handed extension of the same procedural pro-
tections, in a given setting, to all claimant groups.”); cf. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (2011) (“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly
heard.”).
232 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011); see also Barton & Bibas, supra note 103, at 982 (observ-
ing that Turner “recognized that different cases have differing levels of complexity and
differing need for lawyers”); supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text; cf. Kim, supra note
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tomed to accommodating certain subsets of individuals according to
longstanding antidiscrimination statutes, regulations, and executive
orders.233  Thus, while it is possible that subgroup accommodation may
result in perceptions of unfairness and arbitrariness among individuals who
are not members of subgroups, the danger of such perceptions does not out-
weigh the argument in favor of disaggregating due process procedures.
2. Implementation Challenges
Providing meaningful procedural safeguards can be an enormous logisti-
cal challenge, especially considering that many proceedings involve hun-
dreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of individuals per year.234  Indeed,
the task may be even more difficult than the Supreme Court recognized
when it first endeavored to specify the requirements of procedural due pro-
cess.235  And there can be no doubt that shifting from one-size-fits-all proce-
dural rules to rules that vary for certain subgroups would create new burdens
and challenges for the courts and government agencies responsible for pro-
viding the required procedures.  In particular, the task of identifying sub-
group members at the outset of the proceedings—which might even require
some kind of prehearing evidentiary hearing to determine subgroup mem-
133, at 899 (discussing Supreme Court precedent approving of constitutional protections
that vary based on the location of the individual asserting them).
233 For example, federal, state, and local entities are required to provide reasonable
accommodations to individuals with disabilities. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2012).  In addition, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2012), prohibits recipients of federal funding from engaging
in discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, national origin.  This provision has been inter-
preted to require recipients of federal funding to provide meaningful access to their ser-
vices to individuals with limited English proficiency.  Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg.
50,121 (Aug. 16, 2000) (requiring federal agencies to provide meaningful access to individ-
uals with limited English proficiency); 28 C.F.R. § 42.405(d)(1) (2013).
234 See Farina, supra note 98, at 234 (noting the “inescapable reality” that “[p]roviding
mass justice is a staggering task”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some
Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adju-
dication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 813 (1974) (arguing, in the context
of social welfare determinations, that “developing a hearing system which would give assur-
ance that disappointed claimants had experienced fair and accurate determinations of
their claims is quite a subtle and expensive business”); cf. Rubin, supra note 16, at 1044–45
(commenting that the task of determining the procedures required by due process “has
proved to be a dark conundrum for newer forms of government activity, such as benefits
programs, licensing, mass employment, education, and corrections”).
235 See Mashaw, supra note 234, at 815 (arguing that “the difficulties of providing mean-
ingful hearings may be much more significant than the Court was called upon to recognize
in Goldberg”). See generally supra Section I.A (discussing the Court’s shift toward specifying
the requirements of procedural due process).
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bership236—could introduce additional cost, delay, and uncertainty into the
process.237
Requiring subgroup accommodation in certain circumstances will bring
with it new implementation challenges, as would the adoption of any new
procedures.  But those challenges would not necessarily be insurmountable
or unduly burdensome.  More so than at any time since the due process
revolution, subgroup members are easier to identify based on information to
which courts and agencies already have access or to which they can easily
obtain access.238  Yet even when technological innovation is of no help and
an individualized assessment is necessary to determine the identity of sub-
group members, that added burden will be accounted for in the Mathews
analysis.239  In addition, in comparison with the implementation challenges
associated with a case-by-case approach to determining procedural rules, the
clustering of subgroup members would result in a comparatively smaller bur-
den on the government.240
3. Limits and Risks of Constitutionalizing Due Process Subgroups
A third potential objection to seeking additional or alternative procedu-
ral safeguards for subgroups is that obtaining such safeguards through the
Constitution is either not as beneficial as it may seem or is ultimately counter-
productive.  Ever since the due process revolution of the 1970s, scholars have
questioned whether enhanced procedural protections can ensure accuracy
and fairness241 or promote dignity.242  Expanding due process rights for sub-
236 Cf. Note, The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 561 (1967)
(proposing, for identifying individuals entitled to court-appointed counsel, a procedure
that “might make use of a frontline screening agency, whether a judge, a private lawyer
operating under a scheme of state reimbursements, an official or private legal aid agency,
or a public or private referral service”).
237 This argument has been developed with respect to the Supreme Court’s adoption of
a case-by-case approach to determining whether due process requires the provision of
appointed counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 50–52 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing administrative
challenges caused by noncategorical procedural rules); see also supra notes 102–03 and
accompanying text (summarizing criticisms of Lassiter advanced by scholars).
238 See supra Section II.C; cf. Kim, supra note 133, at 897 (arguing, in the context of
subgroups of students subject to criminalized school disciplinary regimes, that “[t]he
increasing availability of relevant data mitigates this concern about administrability”).
239 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (instructing courts to consider
the administrative burden along with the private interests at stake, the risk of erroneous
deprivation, and the value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards).
240 See, e.g., Clapman, supra note 121, at 391 (arguing that in contrast to a case-by-case
analysis, holding that a class of individuals with mental disabilities was entitled to addi-
tional procedural safeguards “makes good sense from a judicial administration
perspective”).
241 See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BUREAUCRACY 22 (1986) (identifying the many conditions that must be satisfied before a
public benefits recipient can successfully overturn an erroneous decision at a fair hearing);
Mashaw, supra note 234, at 787 (arguing that procedural protections in the public benefits
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groups could also be seen as diverting resources and attention from efforts to
broaden the procedural and substantive rights of all individuals.243  Further-
more, as with any attempt to secure procedural rights through the courts,
there is a danger that “judicial declaration of process rights marks the end of
innovation and adaptability.”244
These concerns should not stand in the way of interpreting the Due Pro-
cess Clause to require subgroup accommodation.  The value of due process
procedures certainly has its limits,245 but in the case of due process sub-
groups those limits will be examined and quantified as courts apply the
Mathews test to determine whether due process requires different procedural
safeguards for subgroup members.246  Courts will order such accommoda-
context are unable to ensure the accuracy of eligibility determinations). See generally
Super, supra note 161, at 1086–89 (discussing the limits of procedural due process rights in
the public benefits context).
242 See White, supra note 155, at 887 (“Constitutionalizing welfare procedures has not
done very much to imbue the welfare system with the norms of human dignity that the
[Goldberg v.] Kelly decision rhetorically endorsed.”).
243 See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of
Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1487 (1997) (arguing, in the context of
immigration procedures, that “[j]udicial creation of new procedural due process protec-
tions can lead to reluctance to create new substantive statutory rights”); William E.
Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1821, 1856 (2001) (arguing that expanding procedural rights in the welfare context
has become “a quintessential lawyer’s process-based reform, easily routinized within the
welfare bureaucracy, its pursuit sapping movement energy and gaining nothing of
substance”).
A related concern is that expanding procedural rights may result in the diminishment
of existing substantive rights. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284 (1970)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (raising “the possibility that new layers of procedural protection
may become an intolerable drain on the very funds earmarked for food, clothing, and
other living essentials”). See generally Frug, supra note 97, at 773–77 (discussing the role of
administrative costs in the evaluation of procedural due process claims).
244 Farina, supra note 98, at 254.  As Professor Farina explains, “[w]hen law is under-
stood as demarcating the extent to which one is compelled to yield to the hostile demands
of the other, it is not surprising that a decision which specifies the minimum a losing
official must give, comes to establish the maximum he will offer.” Id.  The experience in
the veterans’ benefits context after Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473
U.S. 305 (1985), offers an interesting counter-example, as Congress revised the attorneys’
fee limitation at issue in Walters and effectively provided the plaintiffs with the relief denied
to them by the courts. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104(a), 102
Stat. 4105 (1988).
245 See generally Parkin, supra note 161, at 1329–33 (summarizing scholarly assessments
of the value of the quintessential due process procedure, the welfare fair hearing required
by Goldberg v. Kelly).
246 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring courts to consider,
inter alia, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”).
But cf. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158 (2011) (“Neither judges nor liti-
gants can identify with any rigor the actual costs of various procedures, let alone model (or
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tion only if the subgroup is able to demonstrate that the additional or alter-
native procedures will in fact reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.
Accordingly, subgroups that are granted different procedural rights will be
those that have proven in court that the new procedures will make a measura-
ble difference in comparison to the existing one-size-fits-all procedures.
Whether the pursuit of new procedural rights for subgroups will divert
attention and resources from broader efforts to expand the rights of all indi-
viduals raises what is essentially a question about strategy.  It is possible that
piecemeal efforts to carve out the subgroups most in need of additional pro-
cedural protections may give the impression that existing procedures are
constitutionally sufficient for everyone else, thereby reducing the likelihood
of across-the-board improvements to existing procedures.  Yet with no
broader expansions of constitutional due process rights on the horizon,247 it
is difficult to ignore an opportunity to ensure that existing procedures are
better tailored to the needs of subgroups.248
It is also possible that subgroup accommodation could ultimately lead to
an overall improvement in existing procedural safeguards.249  The history of
the right to government-appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings,
though distinguishable in obvious ways,250 may be instructive in this
regard.251  Indigent criminal defendants appearing in state court went from
know) the impact in terms of false positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or
different processes . . . . While one can state the equation, one cannot do the math because
the data are missing.”).
247 See, e.g., Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for
Improving Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2217 (2013) (observing that Turner “all
but clos[ed] the door on prospects for a strong constitutional civil Gideon”).
248 See, e.g., Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of
Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697 (2006) (arguing for a broad right to
civil representation but concluding that for strategic reasons, advocates should start with
the right to representation in child custody cases).
249 Russell Engler has discussed this possibility as it relates to efforts to expand the right
to court-appointed counsel in civil cases. See Russell Engler, Toward a Context-Based Civil
Right to Counsel Through “Access to Justice” Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196, 202 (2006)
(“A strategic decision to focus on the narrower group initially might give a foothold to
obtain broader relief in implementing the right to appointed counsel.”); see also Engler,
supra note 248, at 716 (“A success in one context can provide an impetus for expansion
elsewhere.  A narrower victory might yield broader relief where the broader relief is more
financially and administratively feasible.”).
250 A significant difference between the criminal and the civil contexts is that the
source of the procedural safeguard at issue in the criminal context is the Sixth Amend-
ment and not the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(guaranteeing that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence”), with U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (guaranteeing that no
person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law”).
251 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2306 (2013) (“Dur-
ing the years prior to Gideon, some criminal justice experts advocated a universal and high-
quality public defender system, whereas others promoted a more limited approach to
funding defense counsel in only the most crucial cases and when necessary to preserve the
legitimacy of the justice system.”).
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having no constitutional right to appointed counsel, to having a right to
appointed counsel but only if they could prove that they were facing “special
circumstances”252 (essentially a type of subgroup), to having a right to
appointed counsel regardless of their particular situation.253  In this way, the
move to subgroup accommodation under the Due Process Clause could be
seen as the first step toward improved procedures for all.
Concerns that new constitutional rulings on the due process rights of
subgroups may stifle innovation in this area also should not deter arguments
in favor of subgroup accommodation.  As discussed in Section II.A, some fed-
eral, state, and local government agencies are beginning to accommodate
subgroups without being compelled by court rulings on due process
claims.254  Given that these procedural innovations have taken place during a
time when the due process doctrine is perceived to be hostile to the procedu-
ral rights of subgroups,255 moving towards an interpretation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause that requires subgroup accommodation does not seem likely to
halt further government-initiated innovation along these lines.
Finally, it is worth noting that even just a few court decisions recognizing
the rights of due process subgroups could have a large impact on the proce-
dures used by government agencies in other contexts.  As Professor Richard
Pierce has explained, the small number of Supreme Court decisions applying
the Due Process Clause to agency procedures “eventually become major
determinants of administrative procedure through their effects on (1) legis-
latures engaged in drafting the procedural provisions of statutes, (2) courts
engaged in interpreting the often ambiguous procedural provisions of stat-
utes, and (3) agencies engaged in drafting the procedural rules that govern
various types of proceedings.”256  As a result, developing this area of due pro-
cess doctrine through constitutional litigation may have effects far beyond
the lawsuits that result in court decisions.
252 Among the special circumstances recognized by the Supreme Court were cases
involving capital punishment, see, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and cases
involving “complex” legal issues, see, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962);
Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
The Court affirmed this approach to right-to-counsel claims in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,
462 (1942) (observing that the denial of a court-appointed lawyer in state criminal prose-
cutions could “constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,” depending on “the totality of
facts”), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
253 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (overruling Betts v. Brady and holding that indigent
defendants in state criminal proceedings have a right to appointed counsel under the
Sixth Amendment).
254 See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
255 See supra Section I.A.
256 PIERCE, supra note 18, § 9.1, at 735–36.  “Legislatures and agencies can, of course,
choose procedures more demanding than those dictated by due process, but their choice
of procedures is influenced heavily by their beliefs concerning the procedures required by
due process.” Id. §9.1, at 736.
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C. The Essential Link Between Procedural Innovation and Empirical Research
Any discussion of the future of due process subgroups must acknowl-
edge the innovation that has been occurring outside the context of constitu-
tional litigation.  Across the country, a small but growing number of
government agencies and officials, legislatures, advocacy groups, and court
administrators have already recognized the shortcomings of one-size-fits-all
procedures in various contexts.257  Their efforts have brought about new stat-
utes, regulations, policies, and pilot programs that provide additional or
alternative procedural safeguards to subgroups of individuals who are differ-
ently situated from the average or typical person.  Taken together, these
changes have done more to affect the experiences of subgroup members
than has any litigation thus far.258
This Article’s focus on the rights of subgroups under the Due Process
Clause is not meant to minimize the role or importance of the innovation
that is already underway.  To the contrary, litigation and nonlitigation
approaches to subgroup accommodation should reinforce each other: as gov-
ernment agencies demonstrate their ability to accommodate subgroups effec-
tively and without incurring undue expense, it will be harder for courts to
dismiss due process claims seeking similar accommodation.  And, as more
courts order agencies to accommodate subgroups under the Due Process
Clause, it will be harder for agencies to ignore their obligation to ensure that
procedural safeguards accommodate the needs of subgroup members.
These two approaches to subgroup accommodation are also linked by
their reliance on empirical research into the functioning of procedural sys-
tems.  For reforms arising outside the litigation context, data is essential to
convincing policymakers of the need for new procedures and the effective-
ness of potential alternatives.  Data is also essential for reforms pursued
through litigation, as courts must weigh the three Mathews factors based on
evidence provided by the parties.  Although scholars have long expressed
concern over procedural due process rulings that lack a sufficient evidentiary
basis,259 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turner v. Rogers260 appears
257 See supra Section II.A.
258 Cf. Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in Delivering
Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 31–32 (2013) (“The Supreme Court infre-
quently addresses [access to justice] issues, while state courts, state legislatures, and state
access to justice commissions regularly grapple with the flood of unrepresented litigants in
the courts.”).
259 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 98, at 196 (“Although framed in terms that invite quanti-
tative analysis, the Mathews balance is rarely conducted with empirical evidence.”);
Friendly, supra note 20, at 1303 (“It is unfortunate that, five years after Goldberg, we have so
little empirical knowledge how it has worked in its own field, let alone in others where its
principles have been applied.”); Resnik, supra note 246, at 158 (arguing that Mathews’s
“veneer of scientific constraints on judicial judgment can serve to mask the lack of genuine
empiricism,” and that “[n]either judges nor litigants can identify with any rigor the actual
costs of various procedures”); cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress
of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 21 (1988) (observing that the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly
“sought to leaven reason with experience”).
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to signal a renewed commitment to grounding due process rules in empirical
knowledge.261  That type of research has already begun, especially with
respect to the impact of legal representation,262 but much more remains to
be done.263
CONCLUSION
The concept of procedural due process has reached an important
moment in its history.  More than three decades have passed since an “explo-
sion” of due process claims prompted the Supreme Court to develop the
modern approach to procedural due process.264  Despite the passage of time
and predictions of its demise,265 this approach to procedural due process—
including its focus on “the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions”—
remains largely unchanged.  Yet there is still a sense that things are in flux.
The relationship between individuals and government agencies and court sys-
tems is changing, due in large part to evolving technologies.  Digital files are
replacing paper files, video hearings are replacing in-person hearings, web-
sites and apps are replacing offices and caseworkers—not all at once, but one
step at a time.
With this much change in the air, now is the time to reexamine the way
our due process rules are designed.  The reasons to exclude subgroup mem-
bers from the due process calculus are becoming increasingly outdated.
260 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
261 See Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner
and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 62 (2012) (“[D]uring
oral argument, three of the five Justices in the Turner majority specifically requested data as
they sought to weigh due process considerations.”); see also Jeanne Charn, Turner v. Rog-
ers, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 27, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.concurringopinions
.com/archives/2011/06/turner-v-rogers-2.html (arguing that Turner challenges advocates
“to undertake a serious and rigorous examination of what works best in what types of
cases”).  But cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1227, 1236 (2014) (“[T]he [Turner] court provided no empirical evidence to support
assertions about the complexity of procedures and fairness of alternatives.”).
262 See, e.g., D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J.
2118 (2012); D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized
Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901
(2013); Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEAT-
TLE J. SOC. JUST. 51 (2010); Colleen F. Shanahan et al., Representation in Context: Party
Power and Lawyer Expertise (Aug. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2489252.
263 See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Turner v. Rogers and the Right of Meaningful Access to the
Courts, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 805, 821 (2012) (“Unfortunately, there is a shortage of reliable
data concerning what kind of legal assistance various types of litigants need to obtain
meaningful access [to the courts].”).
264 Friendly, supra note 20, at 1268.
265 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1973 (1996) (arguing that “a [due process] counterrevolution will be
fought and won before the turn of the century”).
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That is not to say that due process should require that all subgroups be
accommodated in all situations, only that subgroups should have an opportu-
nity to prove that the Mathews balance may tip in their favor.  Marshaling the
requisite evidence will be essential to any subgroup argument, but so will an
understanding that the Due Process Clause requires procedural safeguards
that meet the needs of subgroup members.
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